

**MAOISM :  
WORDS & DEEDS**

**Vladimir Glebov**



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MAOISM :  
WORDS & DEEDS

## Introduction

China is still in the grip of a grave political crisis. The new leaders who came to power after the death of Mao Tse-tung have made it clear by their acts that they are the inheritors of all his regalia, that they intend to continue Mao's domestic and foreign policies, and follow his nationalistic, great-power, militarist course.

The political statements of Hua Kuo-feng, the present Chairman of the Communist Party of China, and other Peking leaders, and the decisions of the 11th CPC Congress (August 1977), permeated by ideas of hegemony, militarism and hatred of the socialist countries, show clearly that the new Peking administration wants to make the anti-socialist "ideas" of Mao Tse-tung their programme and long-term platform.

As Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, noted in an interview with the editor-in-chief of the Japanese newspaper *Asahi*, "unfortunately, the new Chinese leadership is following the old, beaten track".

And yet the course upon which the Chinese people embarked in 1949 was bright and straight. The People's Republic of China was proclaimed on October 1, of the same year. Not only the Chinese working people and the Chinese Communists, but all people of good will rejoiced on the occasion. Full of hopes for the future, the people of China addressed themselves to the building of a new life. The first steps along this road were not easy. The age-old backwardness of the semi-colonial and semi-feudal country and the poverty of its huge population were very much in evidence. But the enthusiasm of the millions of people, who had won the right to a better life in a long and bloody struggle, and the support of the socialist community, above all of the Soviet Union, were the main thing.

The successes in economic construction and in dealing with



many social problems, achieved in the years of recovery and in the first years of the First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957), testified to the correctness of this orientation.

Taking advantage of these economic successes Mao Tse-tung decided to force the tempo of socialist construction. The original plan for the country's development over the next 15 years was upset. In 1956 the whole of agriculture was organized on cooperative lines and a number of radical reforms effected in industry. Since this "leap" in production relations lacked a material basis, it failed to promote China's successful advance along the socialist road. This setback was pointed out at the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China, held in September 1956—the most representative congress in the history of the party. The congress criticized Mao Tse-tung's "Leftist" experiments, emphasizing that "the tendency of deviating from the Party's general line to the 'Left' has manifested itself mainly in demanding that socialism be achieved overnight..."<sup>1</sup> The congress resolution noted that the basic contradiction inside the country was "between the advanced socialist system and the backward productive forces of society."<sup>2</sup> A conclusion was also drawn in the congress documents that in the struggle between socialism and capitalism in China the question of "who will defeat whom" had already been resolved.

One of the principles of the economic policy drawn up by the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China was comprehensive development of the national economy designed to prevent unjustified expansion of some branches at the expense of others, which might cause dangerous disproportion and disharmony in the economic structure of the country. The congress endorsed the orientation on priority development of heavy industry and also stressed the need to "actively develop light industry", transport and trade, and to "exert ever greater efforts at developing agriculture", and thereby ensuring a "gradual improvement of the life of the people".

The 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China paid special attention to questions pertaining to party life and the

1. *Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China*, Vol. 1. Documents, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1956, p. 20.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 116.

structure of the party. It worked out a set of measures to overcome and avert dangerous petty-bourgeois and nationalist tendencies in the party. The congress condemned the personality cult of Mao Tse-tung and deleted in the party Rules the mention of his ideas as the "ideological basis of the Party", which had been in the Rules ever since the 7th Party Congress (1945). The new Rules of the Communist Party of China affirmed: "The Communist Party of China takes Marxism-Leninism as its guide to action. Only Marxism-Leninism correctly sets forth the laws of development of society and correctly charts the path leading to the achievement of socialism and communism."<sup>1</sup>

Consistent implementation of the decisions of the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China could have ensured China's further progress along the road to socialism, and opened up new possibilities for the growth of the country's productive forces by utilising the advantages of socialist forms of economic management.

The successful building of the foundations of socialism in the first decade after the proclamation of the People's Republic of China was possible mainly due to the efforts of the Marxist-Leninist wing in the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the broad application of the experience of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and was achieved despite the theoretical concepts of Mao Tse-tung.

Attempting to implement his petty-bourgeois notions of socialism, Mao began, in the late 1950s, to actively force upon the party and the Chinese people his special line in domestic and foreign policy, a line which differed from the line of the 8th Congress. The theoretical foundation of this programme was Maoism, a confused mixture of ideas taken from a variety of philosophical teachings—from the thoughts of ancient Chinese philosophers to individual Marxist theses. Disguised with ultra-revolutionary phrases, Maoism is not only the opposite of Marxism-Leninism, but is hostile to it.

Within the country this line was given the form of the so-called policy of the "Three Red Banners" (the "great leap" the

1. *The Constitution of the Communist Party of China*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1956, p. 9.



"people's communes" and the "general line").

When Mao Tse-tung's group proclaimed the idea of the "great leap forward", it expected that it would in one single stroke cope with all the problems and difficulties of the country, and achieve considerable progress in economic development.

The "People's communes" were to translate these ideas into reality. The Maoist leadership called for "active use of the form of the people's commune and to find through it the concrete road of the transition to communism."<sup>1</sup> Within a few months a total "communization" of the countryside was carried out. Twenty-six thousand people's communes were set up on the basis of 740,000 cooperatives; they incorporated agricultural, industrial and military affairs, and were in effect self-governing entities.

The "general line" with which the Maoists armed themselves contained a vague demand—"with the utmost exertion, making constant progress, to build socialism according to the principle: more, faster, better, and more economically". But how could this be achieved? The answer to this question was to be found in Maoist slogans, such as "politics is the guiding force", "development in waves", "agriculture is the basis", etc.

The policy of the "Three Red Banners" (1958-1962) proved to be unviable within a year of its promulgation. Disproportions in industry grew wider, and the percentage of unfinished and incomplete production in the total volume of output shot up. In consequence of the "storm" methods of work "to the point of complete exhaustion" and the neglect of technological norms and regulations, the number of rejected items increased considerably, as did the number of industrial accidents. There was discontent among the peasantry due to the liquidation of individual plots and local markets. The villages were badly hit by the policy of sending millions of peasants to work in steel mills and coal and ore mines, where primitive cottage-industry methods were still in use. Tens of millions of people were moved from villages to towns in 1958. The result was a phenomenon, unheard of in China—a shortage of labour in rural districts. As a result, the 1958 crops were badly harvested

1. *Jenmin jihpao* (People's Daily, September 10, 1958).

in many areas, and part of the crops was not harvested at all. The construction of irrigation systems without any technical planning resulted in distortion of the soil structure and the swamping and salinisation of large areas. At the end of 1958 it was evident that the state would be unable to fulfil the planned target of foodstuff purchases. Great difficulties arose in the supply of food to the cities and raw materials to the light and food industries.

In the "great leap" period the main goal of the socio-economic programme of the Maoists was distinctly manifest. It was to turn the whole country into one huge militarised commune where there would be a system of natural economy supplying the population with food and clothing on an egalitarian basis on the level of elementary needs. That system of "barracks socialism" made it possible to ruthlessly exploit the working class and the peasantry and to use all the resources created by their labour for the realization of Mao's great-power designs, and for war preparations.

The general outcome of the "great leap" was: by 1962, industrial production had dropped by almost 50 per cent compared to 1959; steel production was down by 46 per cent, coal production by 48 per cent, iron ore by 66 per cent. In 1961 only 165 million tons of grain was harvested, whereas in 1957, before the "great leap", grain harvest was 186 million tons. In 1960-1961 hunger began to stalk the country.

The bankruptcy of the "great leap" policy, and the fact that the Party cadres began to understand the adventurous character of Mao Tse-tung's line were especially evident at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at Lushan in August 1959. In a letter sent to Mao Tse-tung by the then Defence Minister, Marshal Peng Te-huai, the "great leap" and the "people's communes" were openly criticized. Despite the fact that part of the leadership of the Communist Party of China agreed with these comments, Mao Tse-tung used threats and promises to force the plenary meeting to adopt a special resolution on an "anti-Party group headed by Peng Te-huai". In this resolution, Peng Te-huai's letter was characterized as a "programme of an attack waged by rightist-opportunist elements against the Party". Peng and his



supporters were removed from their posts.

However, even the most stubborn supporters of the "leap" began to realize that it was necessary for them to take emergency steps in order to lead the country out of the grave economic crisis. The turn towards resolute measures was outlined in a resolution adopted by the 9th plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, held in January 1961. The plenum adopted a course towards "stabilization" (i.e., rectification of the critical state of the economy), and the People's Republic of China implemented this course between 1961 and 1965. Mao was forced to step down from his post as Chairman of the People's Republic of China in favour of Liu Shao-chi, a member of the Political Bureau, and to retire, as he himself put it, "to the second line". The consequences of Mao's crimes against the Chinese nation had to be borne by other leaders and, primarily, by the grassroot cadres of the party who had allegedly failed fully to comprehend the depth of "Mao's thought". Thus the myth of the infallibility of Mao Tse-tung's ideas and the cult of his personality remained intact, which gave Mao a starting point for another offensive. The leading officials of the Communist Party of China who criticized Mao did not find sufficient strength to fully expose and rectify all the mistakes. Moreover, after the failure of the "great leap", when they were in disagreement with Mao Tse-tung on the fundamental questions of China's development, these leaders still sought a compromise with him and thus helped to inflate his personality cult.

This enabled Mao and his group to set up their struggle against those who understood how harmful Mao's activities were for China. The road chosen by Mao thus came into sharp conflict with the interests of the party and the people, as much as with the social and state systems of the People's Republic of China. Further realization of Mao's line was impossible without changing the character of the Communist Party of China itself, without fundamental political changes in the country and of course without a break with the world socialist system. To push through his policy Mao chose—just as in the period before the "great leap"—a period of relative achievement attained by China in the years of "stabilization".

In February 1957, at the Supreme State Conference of the People's Republic of China, Mao Tse-tung gave a speech. "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People", in which a programme for solving the country's development problems was expounded, and which differed from the decisions of the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China. And at the 10th plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (1962) Mao declared that the basic substance of socialism was class struggle. The political campaigns which he inspired in that period, under the slogans "Let a hundred flowers blossom, let a hundred schools of thought contend", "Fight the Right-wing elements", etc., and which plunged the country into ideological chaos, were meant to bear out that conclusion. Thus, Maoism's chief dogma of "continuation of the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" gradually emerged. By revising the decisions of the 8th Congress in the speeches made at the Supreme State Conference and the 10th plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Mao had proceeded to consolidate his position in both the party and the state.

In the autumn of 1966, the struggle in the leadership of the People's Republic of China around fundamental political questions reached a climax. At the 11th plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Mao Tse-tung issued his call—"Bombard the headquarters", in which he openly urged the destruction of the central and local party bodies, branded as "bourgeois headquarters". The meeting proceeded without the participation of many Central Committee members who had become the victims of the disturbances caused by the "cultural revolution" (Wenhua Koming), launched on Mao's instructions. Having revised the decisions of the 8th Party Congress, the plenary meeting proclaimed Mao's ideas the basis for all party activities and "legalized" the "cultural revolution".

At the first stage of the "cultural revolution", "red guards" (hungweipings), politically immature young people from among students, and "rebels" (tsaofangs) recruited from factory and office workers, became the tools of the Maoists. Behind their backs stood the army. With the help of the Defence Minister Lin Piao, Mao Tse-tung began in 1960 to shape the army as a



counterweight to the party. The army became the shield of Maoism, and was presented as an "example" for all people, and the "mainstay of the dictatorship of the proletariat".

The "cultural revolution" was in fact a counter-revolutionary coup in which the leading bodies of party, trade-union and Young Communist League organizations were destroyed, and Mao Tse-tung's military-bureaucratic dictatorship was installed.

The results of the "cultural revolution" were summed up at the 9th Congress of the Maoist Communist Party of China in April 1969. The 9th Party Congress showed that the Maoist leadership had completely abandoned scientific communism and proletarian internationalism. This congress marked a new stage in the development of Maoism into a form of militarism and Chinese-style social-chauvinism. Military hysteria began to escalate in the country under the slogan "Be prepared against war and natural disasters".

At the 9th Congress, "Mao's thoughts" were declared to be the theoretical foundation of the Communist Party of China, and Lin Piao was named the Mao Tse-tung's "successor".

This, however, was not the end of the struggles within the Maoist leadership. When Mao began to realize that Lin Piao had too much power in the army, the party and the state and that the "successor" sometimes used it against the Chairman's authority, another round of the internal struggle flared up. In the autumn of 1971, this struggle led to Lin Piao's death and to the removal of several other high-ranking military commanders.

The 10th Congress of the Communist Party of China, held in August 1973, branded Lin Piao as a "super-spy" and a "man of two faces". All the accusations levelled against the once influential Defence Minister, and the elaborately phrased allegations that Lin Piao, having committed treason, had tried to escape to the Soviet Union and had been killed in an air crash in Mongolia were of a demagogic nature. The "Lin Piao crisis" was another crisis of the Maoist leadership in its unprincipled struggle for power; it reflected Mao Tse-tung's determination to remain in power at all costs, and to make himself secure against high-ranking military commanders who had great influence in the army, the party and the state apparatus.

The 10th Congress confirmed the anti-Soviet line of the

Maoists. The congress documents supplemented the thesis that the Soviet Union is "enemy No. 1" by proclaiming the "need to make preparations for an attack by social-imperialism."

At the first session of the 4th National People's Congress in January 1975, Mao's regime of military-bureaucratic dictatorship received constitutional approval. But the fight within the Maoist leadership continued. In Chou En-lai's report to the session of the National People's Congress, some of the pressing problems of the country's development were outlined in very general terms. Fearing that this would give an impulse to strengthen realistic trends in China's economy, Mao Tse-tung hastened to arrest such a turn of development, and launched a whole series of political campaigns against the dissenters, which actually represented a continuation of the "cultural revolution". During the campaign of the "study of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat", the Maoists sought to impress on the Chinese people that labour remuneration according to work done, bonuses and overtime pay, individual plots and small-scale ancillary production are "bourgeois phenomena" and must be restricted. The press was full of slogans: "To work more, to receive less", "To work without thinking of remuneration", etc. The response was mass strikes of the working people in 1974-1975.

The campaign of the "study of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat", like other political campaigns launched by the Maoists in that period, was a reflection of the intricate internal political struggle in China, which ultimately boiled down to a struggle for power.

But Mao and the interpreters of his doctrine explained that all these campaigns were a confirmation of Mao's theory of the "continuation of the revolution under dictatorship of the proletariat". They attributed a class character to each campaign, even if it was based on criticism of the ancient sage Confucius or on discussion of the medieval novel "Water Margin". In the party "class enemies" and "capitalist-roaders" (persons allegedly following the capitalist road) were sought out, and all dissenters were dealt with ruthlessly.

In the final analysis the political campaigns of 1973-1976—like the "cultural revolution", whose end was officially announced



in August 1977 by the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China—reflected the constant struggle between two lines in China: the Marxist-Leninist line, which was making its way with great difficulty and much sacrifice, and the Maoist, nationalist line, which crushed any attempt to depart from Maoist dogmas.

Maoism, with its whole array of pseudo-scientific "ideas" and theories, and the entire complex of erroneous practices, continued to hang over the country like the sword of Damocles. It had not been possible, as practical experience of two decades had shown, to solve a single political or economic problem by relying on these "ideas".

It is impossible to declare the ultimate goal to be the building of a communist society in China and to consider war a means of attaining that goal.

It is impossible to ensure an expansion of industry and agriculture and at the same time to carry out a rapid militarization programme which consumes all of the country's means and resources.

It is impossible to speak seriously of the development of democracy in China and of the great role of the working class which supposedly "guides all", to praise the Chinese toiling peasant and at the same time to regard the workers as unthinking cog-wheels and the peasants as "obedient oxen", and to take pride in the fact that after nearly three decades of people's power in China, the "poor and lower middle peasants" form the basis of the regime.

The irreconcilable contradiction between the aspirations of the Chinese people for a better life and Mao Tse-tung's "thoughts" remained China's most pressing problem.

Mao Tse-tung died in Peking on September 9, 1976 at the age of 83.

Who was to stand at the head of the Chinese population of 800 million? What road would the new leaders choose for China? Everybody in China was thinking about these questions in those days. The people linked their hopes for the future with the answers to these questions. They still believed that Maoism was capable of saving the country from the crisis and the people from grief and hardships.

"With you in charge, I'm at ease"—this is alleged to be Mao's political behest to Hua Kuo-feng. To execute this will, and to take power in his hands Hua had to get rid of four leading politicians who had been among Mao Tse-tung's closest associates. These four people called for the execution of another political behest of Mao: "To act according to the charted course", and claimed power in the belief that they had every right to steer the Maoist ship along this course.

The four were prominent members of the Political Bureau: Mao Tse-tung's widow, Chiang Ching; Wang Hung-wen, Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China; Chang Chun-chiao, Deputy Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China; and Yao Wen-yuang, Chinese propaganda chief.

The conflict was resolved in favour of Hua Kuo-feng. The four were branded as enemies of Mao and the nation. *Jenmin jihpao* of April 27, 1977 wrote:

"On the basis of a great deal of irrefutable evidence, it has been established that Chang Chun-chiao is a special agent of the Kuomintang, that Chiang Ching is a traitor, Yao Wen-yuang, an alien class element, and Wang Hung-wen, a bourgeois element of the new formation. In short, this is a gang of counter-revolutionaries, Chang Chun-chiao and Chiang Ching being double counter-revolutionaries both in the past and at present. The sectarian four are a black gang of old and new counter-revolutionaries, a counter-revolutionary grouping lurking in the camp of the revolution, a whole independent underground kingdom".

As could be expected from the "logic" and practices of Maoism, the frenzied exponents of "Mao's thoughts" became its victims.

At first the Chinese people welcomed the criticism and exposure of the "gang of four", thinking that this was a turn for the better. But their hope was not destined to be fulfilled.

The new leaders of the People's Republic of China, who were implicitly dedicated to Maoism, used criticism of the "four" to consolidate their own power. Today in China the same calls to tighten the belt and prepare for a "great leap" are still heard, the same lies about world socialism, and the



same slogans about the inevitability of war—the entire old propaganda arsenal.

However, to rid the country of the economic and political crisis which Mao Tse-tung created, the Chinese leaders have taken a number of concrete measures. The wages of some categories of workers were raised; after a ten-year interval, admission to higher educational establishments was resumed; newspapers began to talk about the “profitability of enterprises” and “material incentive”.

These moves show, above all, that many Maoist dogmas, within a year of their author's death, became serious obstacles to the country's development. Nevertheless, these realistic tendencies are struggling in the face of noisy extolling of Mao's wisdom, of the everlasting value of his dogmas and ideas.

The quagmire of Maoism is still gripping the new leaders of China, and they cannot combine the incompatible—Maoism and the interests of the Chinese nation.

The international activity of the Chinese leaders is still based on the discredited “foreign-policy line of Mao Tse-tung”. This line took shape over a number of years as Mao step by step betrayed Marxism. An important landmark in the Maoists' struggle against Marxism-Leninism in the international arena were the decisions of the 10th plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. It was at that plenary meeting that Mao first advanced a number of concepts which signified an extension of the policy of “intensification of the class struggle under socialism” to relations of the Communist Party of China with other communist parties. These “special precepts” of Mao on questions relating to the strategy and tactics of the international communist movement were tantamount to a denial of the socialist system's increasingly decisive influence on world developments, disregard for the working-class struggle in capitalist countries, opposition of the national liberation movement to the world socialist system and the international working-class movement, adventurism in foreign policy, sectarianism in matters concerning revolution, and justification of the factional struggle in the communist movement. All this subsequently served as a basis for the formulation of such Maoist dogmas as the theories of the “three worlds”, of “social-imperialism”, of the “superpowers”,

of the “inevitability of a world war”, etc.

China is the only country in the world whose official circles come out publicly and openly as apologists of a world war and whose constitution legally affirms such views.

Not only does the new leadership of the People's Republic of China seek to keep the basic trends of the former foreign policy course intact, but they are also actively developing the tendency which emerged in Mao Tse-tung's lifetime and was designed to promote closer relations with the imperialist countries, aggressive military blocs and with the most odious political regimes and figures. Today this policy is being conducted, as before, on a common platform of hatred of the Soviet Union, of the idea of the social transformation of the world along socialist lines and of the idea of *detente* and peace. The Chinese leadership continues to abandon proletarian internationalism and betray the interests of the workers of all countries. It has proclaimed and is implementing another “revolutionary” slogan: “unite with whomever it is possible”, be it the fascist dictator Pinochet of Chile, British Conservative leader Margaret Thatcher, revanchist Franz Josef Strauss of West Germany, US Senator Jackson and Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, who are rabid opponents of *detente*.

The year 1977 was declared in China as a year of “extensive exposure and deep criticism of the crimes committed by the ‘gang of four’”, who are accused of “hampering the development of China's relations with other countries”. “Other countries” by no means refers to the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. Under the guise of “exposure and criticism” campaigns, intensive indoctrination of the public is being conducted with the aim of consolidating the unprincipled course of collaborating with all those forces in the international arena which can be used to combat the socialist community and its policy of ensuring *detente* and a peaceful life for all nations.

Being under the spell of Maoist dogmas and continuing to follow the “old, beaten track”, the Peking leaders are leading the country to new upheavals, to new hardships and sufferings for the Chinese people. The adventurism and anti-human theories of the Maoists present a grave danger to all the



peoples of the world.

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This book is an attempt to analyze the origin, development and practical application of the most widespread domestic and international political slogans of Maoist propaganda.

The author pays special attention to the attempt of the present leaders of the People's Republic of China to show the continuing "value" of Maoism for today's China and for the "world revolution".

The reader will be able to understand the workings of the Maoists' propaganda machine and how they use China's mass media to bring their dogmas to the masses.

## I. DOMESTIC POLICY

"CONTINUATION OF THE REVOLUTION UNDER THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT"

"STRUGGLE OF TWO LINES"

"THE PARTY RULES ALL"

"POLITICS IS THE GUIDING FORCE"

THE "GREAT LEAP"

"TO RELY ON ONE'S OWN FORCES"

"POWER GROWS OUT OF THE BARREL OF A GUN"

"LINE OF THE MASSES"



## "Continuation of the Revolution under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat"

"Probably another revolution will have to be carried out after several years."

Mao Tse-tung. Documents of the 10th Congress of the Communist Party of China

What is the essence of the concept of revolution formulated by Mao Tse-tung as "continuation of the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat?"

"It is the most important achievement of Marxism in our time..." and "occupies an especially prominent place in the history of the development of Marxism". This was how Hua Kuo-feng described the concept at the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China.

Why do the Maoists attach such exceptional importance to this concept?

Mao Tse-tung distorted and repudiated the general laws of the socialist revolution and of the construction of socialism and communism back in the 1950s. To justify and camouflage the ruthless struggle against his political adversaries, he put forward the thesis of "intensification of the class struggle under socialism" and of the need "to fight constantly" against "enemies" and "counter-revolutionary elements". Included in this category were above all Marxist-Leninist communists and the more active representatives of the working people who took a stand against Mao Tse-tung's petty-bourgeois policy and defended the Marxist-Leninist general line of the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China. At the 8th Congress it was unambiguously stated: "...so long as our policy is correct, counter-revolutionaries can be wiped out, and there are no grounds for the belief that counter-revolutionary activities are getting more serious."<sup>1</sup>

Mao countered this Marxist conclusion with a concept of his own. He wrote: "Many dare not openly admit that

1. *Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China*, Vol. 1, Documents, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1956, p. 83.

contradictions still exist among the people of our country, although it is these very contradictions that are pushing our society forward. Many do not admit that contradictions continue to exist in a socialist society..."<sup>1</sup> Thus, according to Mao, it is not the moral-political unity of the people that constitutes the basis of the socialist way of life, but artificially created "contradictions among the people". Acting contrary to the decisions of the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China, which considered that in China the question of "who will defeat whom" had been resolved in favour of socialism, Mao advanced a thesis on the intensification of the class struggle under socialism. He managed to impose his views regarding this question at the 10th plenum of the Party Central Committee of the 8th convocation (September 1962).

The communique of the 10th plenum stated that "throughout the whole historical period of transition from capitalism to communism there is class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie". At this plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee Mao Tse-tung issued the slogan "Never forget the classes and the class struggle". On this basis he later formulated his concept of the need to "continue the revolution" under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The essence of the theory of continuing the revolution is expounded by the Maoists as follows:

"...socialist society covers a historical period of considerable length and...in this period classes, class contradictions and class struggle, the struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road and the danger of capitalist restoration invariably continue to exist, and there is the threat of subversion and aggression by imperialism and social-imperialism".<sup>2</sup>

From this the following conclusion is drawn:

"Therefore in this historical period, it is imperative for the proletariat to persist in its struggle against the bourgeoisie

1. Mao Tse-tung, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People". In: Mao Tse-tung, *On New Democracy, Talks at the Yen'an Forum on Literature and Art, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People, Speech at the Chinese Communist Party's National Conference on Propaganda Work*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1967, p. 177.

2. *Peking Review*, No. 35, August 26, 1977, p. 31.



and in its dictatorship over the latter and it is imperative to persist in continuing the revolution under this dictatorship<sup>1</sup>".

According to Marxism-Leninism, in a socialist society, which is the first phase of the communist social and economic formation, antagonistic classes do not exist. The Communist Party pursues a policy of alliance between friendly classes. But Mao Tse-tung claims that socialism is a society of the transitional period from capitalism to communism, in which the bourgeoisie continues to exist (and constantly regenerates itself) alongside the working class and the peasantry. To resolve the question of "who will defeat whom", the working people must allegedly wage a fierce class struggle against the bourgeoisie "throughout the historical period of socialism", i.e., "carry on the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat". Moreover, Mao interpreted the term "bourgeoisie" in a very special way of his own. Substituting political contradictions in society for class ones, Mao called all those who did not share his political views members of the "bourgeois" class. Thus workers, peasants and representatives of the intelligentsia found themselves in the "bourgeois" camp. At the same time Mao included the national bourgeoisie in the term "the people", and, according to him, contradictions do exist between the national bourgeoisie and the people, but they "are not of an antagonistic nature". It is therefore natural that bourgeois parties exist in China to this day.

By declaring Mao's theory to be a "new development" in Marxism, the new leaders of China are obviously committing a sin against history. The kinship between the Maoist allegations about the danger of a "bourgeois degeneration" in socialist society and Trotsky's slander of socialism is evident. In his theory of "permanent revolution", Trotsky had, long before Mao, advanced similar propositions on revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Trotsky wrote, in part:

"Socialist revolution does not come to an end...All social relations change in the wake of a ceaseless and mounting internal struggle...In intervals between consecutive internal and

1. *ibid.*

external wars, periods of peaceful transformations alternate."

The thesis on Mao Tse-tung's "new contribution" to Marxism therefore does not hold water.

The Maoist theory of "continuation of the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" states the need for "class struggle even after the building of a communist society". Mao attributes the need for this struggle to such factors as China's enormous population and conflicts between subordinates and their superiors. He asserts:

"There is no progress without struggle. Can 800 million people possibly do without struggle?" "Will a revolution be necessary after a hundred years? Will it be needed after a thousand years? Definitely yes. A section of people will, in one way or another, feel oppressed. Minor officials, students, workers, peasants and soldiers do not like being oppressed by superior persons. This is why they want revolution. Is it possible that no contradictions will be seen in ten thousand years' time? How can that be? Of course they will be seen."<sup>1</sup>

In the period of the "great leap", Mao's group began to claim that not only socialism, but also communism would be achieved in the near future by the Chinese people. But after the disastrous failure of the "great leap" Mao Tse-tung swung to the opposite extreme and began to regard the completion of socialist construction as a matter of a very distant future. An editorial carried by both the *Jenmin jihpao* and the journal *Hungchi* (Red Flag) on June 14, 1964 and written by Mao Tse-tung, said that "the final victory of socialism cannot be achieved during the lifetime of one or two generations. Full victory can be achieved in five to ten generations, or in an even longer period of time".

In keeping with these pessimistic "conclusions", Mao Tse-tung's group pursued a policy of curtailing socialist construction in the country from the early 1960s. At the same time, calls continued to appear in the Maoist press for the need to "carry on the revolution" and "protect the revolution against the enemies". But the concrete tasks of socialist construction were left out of these calls. The slogan "carry on the revolution"

1. *Jenmin jihpao*, May 16, 1976.



was imposed by Mao Tse-tung on the people only to make them "valiantly endure privations and poverty" in the name of the revolution, "to wage a long-term fight against the enemies for the cause of the revolution". In other words, the thesis of the need to "carry on the revolution" was used to help Mao's group relentlessly impose Mao Tse-tung's "line" over a long period of time, and facilitate its fight against the political adversaries of Mao's "thoughts" and "line", whom official propaganda began to describe as "enemies" and "counter-revolutionary elements".

The Maoists present the "cultural revolution" as a splendid example of the implementation of the "theory of continuation of the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat", as an important step forward on China's road towards socialism. However, the "cultural revolution" was a concrete example of how Mao's group, with the help of pseudo-revolutionary slogans, ruthlessly eliminated the opponents of Mao Tse-tung's "thoughts and line", carrying out reprisals against the people and the party, retarding the country's economic growth, and further diverting China from the socialist road of development.

The Maoists now fervently declare that upheavals like the "cultural revolution" will recur in the country not once, but ten times, twenty times ! The new leaders intend to use the "theory" of "continuation of the revolution" in their long-term, ruthless suppression of political opponents. No wonder this Maoist dogma was included in the Rules of the Communist Party of China adopted by the 11th Party Congress. According to the Maoists, the so-called "revolutionary successors" (children, grand children and great grandchildren) are to "carry on the revolution" in the "post-Mao" period "even more actively and consistently" in order to preserve and consolidate the regime they inherit from Mao Tse-tung.

The followers of Mao Tse-tung are extensively using the thesis of "continuation of the revolution" also in their subversive activities in the international communist movement and in their struggle against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The Maoists accuse the USSR and other socialist countries of having "halted the revolution" and "the class struggle

against the enemies of the revolution". The alleged result was that "the bourgeoisie has come to power again", and that "capitalism has been restored" in the Soviet Union and in other socialist countries. In their anti-Soviet propaganda, the Maoists frequently resort to claims that the Soviet Union has become a revisionist state and is trying to extend its bourgeois influence to other countries, particularly to China. Moreover, Mao's anti-Marxist "theory" of the "continuation of the revolution" is presented by the Maoists as a kind of a "ready-made prescription" which the peoples of the USSR and other socialist states are to follow in order to fight "revisionism" and "capitalism" in their countries. The Maoists are thus widely using this theory as a tool for their anti-Soviet policy on the world scene.

The concept of "continuation of the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat", which is one of the most important elements of the whole ideology and practice of Maoism, was produced by Mao Tse-tung by grossly distorting and falsifying the most important tenets of Marxism-Leninism concerning classes and the class struggle, the socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat and the ways of building socialism and communism.

### "Struggle of Two Lines"

"Great disorder across land leads to great order. And so once again every seven years. Monsters and demons will jump out themselves. Determined by their own class nature, they are bound to jump out."

Mao Tse-tung. Documents of the 10th Congress of the Communist Party of China.

Mao Tse-tung is the author of the idea of the permanent recurrence of the "struggle of two lines". Mao Tse-tung formulated this "discovery" during his inspection tour of China in August and September 1971. He said at that time : "Our



Party has existed for fifty years, and during that time a serious struggle of lines was waged ten times."

Mao laid the "theoretical" basis for the discovery even earlier. Addressing the Supreme State Conference of the People's Republic of China in February 1957, he formulated the concept of "correct resolution of contradictions among the people". The concept divided society according to the "class" principle into two parts: "the people" and "the enemies of the people". The criterion for determining which class one group or the other belonged to was not its relationship to the means of production, as Marxist-Leninist theory requires, but their attitude to the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung". What were really political contradictions, Mao labelled "class" contradictions, and his political opponents became an "antagonistic class" against which a ceaseless "class struggle" had to be waged. In defiance of the decisions of the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China, Mao asserted that "the class struggle is not yet over".

Projecting the theory of incessant class struggle onto the history of the Communist Party of China, Maoist historians proposed at the time of the 11th Party Congress a scheme of the struggle of "two lines" within the party which included, as the newspaper *Kwangming jihpao* wrote, "eleven rounds". It includes the struggle with the Right-opportunist line of Chen Tu-hsiu<sup>1</sup> (1927) and with the Left-opportunist line of Chu Chiu-po<sup>2</sup> (1928), with the Left deviation of Li Li-san<sup>3</sup> (1930)

1. Chen Tu-hsiu (1879-1942); One of the most active revolutionary democrats in the 1920s. After the formation of the Communist Party of China he was its General Secretary. In 1927 he was removed from the party leadership and expelled from the party in 1929.
2. Chu Chiu-po (1899-1935). A prominent communist internationalist. He joined the Communist Party of China in 1922. In 1927 he was elected Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and remained in this office until the 6th Party Congress. In March 1935 he was seized by the Kuomintang and was shot on June 18, 1935.
3. Li Li-san (1896-1967 [?]). A member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China from 1927. He virtually played the leading role in the party in 1929-1930. The 4th plenum of the Party Central Committee (January 1931) condemned his Leftist line.

From 1948 to 1953 Li Li-san was first vice-chairman of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions; from 1949 to 1954—Minister of labour of the People's Republic of China.

and the Right deviation of Lo Chang-lung<sup>1</sup> (1931). The fifth round is considered to be the long struggle against Wang Ming<sup>2</sup> (1935-1938). Then come the criticism and "exposure"<sup>3</sup> of Chang Kuo-tao (1938).

Before the victory of the people's revolution in China this struggle was spearheaded mainly against the internationalist forces inside the Communist Party of China; subsequently those who disagreed with Mao's political line came increasingly under attack. Hence the next (seventh) round of struggle, in which Kao Kang<sup>4</sup> came under the fire of Maoist "criticism". Then followed the drubbing of Peng Te-huai<sup>1</sup>

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In 1963-1964 some Western sources called him second secretary of the North China Bureau of the Party Central Committee.

"Tatsupao" criticizing Li Li-san appeared in Peking in 1967.

In August 1967 Western correspondents reported that Li Li-san had committed suicide.

1. Lo Chang-lung (b. 1890?). One of the first Chinese communists. From 1923 to 1927 he was in the leading bodies of the party and from 1930 the head of the All-China Council of Trade Unions. Further information about his fate is not available in the Chinese press.
2. Wang Ming (Chen Shao-yu) (1904-1974). Party member from 1926. In 1931 he was elected a member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. From 1931 to 1937, he served as the representative of the Communist Party of China in the Comintern. He was an advocate of friendship with the Soviet Union and of the principles of socialist construction tried and tested by Soviet experience. In 1956, with the approval of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, he went to the Soviet Union for treatment, and stayed there until his death.
3. Chang Kuo-tao (b. 1899). One of the founders of the Communist Party of China. For two decades he held a number of top posts in the party's central bodies. From 1937 to 1938, chairman of the government in one of the liberated areas of China. In 1938 he broke with the Communist Party of China ideologically and organizationally. He now lives in Canada.
4. Kao Kang (1891-1955). Party member from 1926. Between 1945 and 1953 he headed the party organization and the people's government in North-East China. In 1953 he became Deputy Premier of the Central People's Government. A communist-internationalist, he advocated strengthening friendship with the Soviet Union. In 1955, he was accused of plotting to seize power in the party and the state. It was officially announced that Kao Kang did not admit his guilt and committed suicide.
1. Peng Te-huai (b. 1898). Party member, from 1928. From 1945 Deputy Chief Commander of the People's Liberation Army. Between 1954 and 1959 Defence Minister, Marshal, Deputy Premier of the State Council. In 1959 he stood up against the "policy of the Three Red Banners", for which he was accused of "anti-party activities". No official reports are available about him now.



at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Lushan in 1959. The ninth round, according to Maoist historians, is the struggle against the Chairman of the People's Republic of China, Liu Shao-chi, who was removed from all his posts in 1968. The tenth stage of the struggle of "lines" was the removal of the official successor to Mao Tse-tung, Marshal Lin Piao, in September 1971. The last, eleventh, round of the struggle took place after the death of Mao Tse-tung and was connected with the exposure of the so-called "gang of four", who had been among Mao's closest associates.

Thus, the history of the Communist Party of China, according to the Maoists, is a history of continuous victories of Chairman Mao's "revolutionary line" over "Left-and Right-opportunist" lines.

The struggle between the Marxist-Leninist, internationalist course and the petty-bourgeois nationalist tendency is a characteristic feature of the entire history of the Communist Party of China. Among the eleven "rounds" of struggle within the Party, with which the Maoists make great play, there really were deviations against which the party fought with the help of the international communist movement. It must be noted, however, that Mao and his followers used this struggle for their personal aims. Moreover, Mao Tse-tung shared many of the views against which the struggle was directed. Using Marxist phraseology as a mask, he always remained a petty-bourgeois nationalist.

However, a great majority of the "deviations", such as the "line of Wang Ming", the "case of Kao Kang", the "case of Peng Te-huai" and others, were fabricated by the Maoists.

Since the 1950s, the inner-party struggle in the Communist Party of China had been more and more frequently nothing but infighting between various groups within the Maoist camp itself. This clear fact, which shows the aggravating crisis of Maoism, also demands special caution in evaluating the character of the inner-party struggle within the Communist Party of China in the past two decades, because not all the victims of Maoist repressions were spokesmen of the sound forces and

tendencies inside the party. While the actions of Peng Te-huai and his followers against Mao Tse-tung may rightly be assessed as stemming from Marxist positions, the "case of Lin Piao" or the removal of Chen Po-ta, who had been Mao's personal secretary for decades, and especially the exposure of the "gang of four", campaigners and apologists of Maoism, should be considered as instances of unprincipled inter-party struggle.

It should be noted that the struggle against the "gang of four" is being waged with the help of the same formulas and methods which the "four" used in combating their political opponents. This once again shows that the so-called "struggle of lines" in this case is actually a "struggle of persons" who stand on the Maoist platform and only disagree on minor issues.

In analyzing the history of the "struggle of two lines" inside the Communist Party of China one cannot overlook the question of why, since the 1940s, the sound forces in the party were, as a rule, defeated and won only infrequently, and for short periods of time. The main cause of the temporary (from the historical point of view) victory of petty-bourgeois, nationalist tendencies in the Communist Party of China is apparently the unfavourable balance of class forces in the country.

As a consequence of Mao Tse-tung's policy, the party was largely divorced from the working class which was intentionally disunited. In the late 1950s, a huge mass of peasants were sent to the towns to work in industry, in keeping with the policy of the "great leap". This resulted in a partial dispersal of the proletariat among the petty-bourgeois peasant element. In the period of "stabilization" there was an outflow of workers employed in the sphere of material production. The Maoists took advantage of the existing multi-grade wage system in the country, alienated and divided the working class of the country, intentionally set young workers against old ones, seasonal workers against regular ones, skilled workers against the unskilled, etc.

A large part of the peasantry became victims of pseudo-revolutionary Maoist slogans.

Relying on the army, manoeuvring between the classes, counting on using the petty-bourgeois and backward peasant



strata, Mao Tse-tung appealed to the masses in words, while actually suppressing them at the same time.

But the experience of the "struggle of two lines" in the Communist Party of China, especially that of the past few years, shows that the continuous use of force, dictatorial methods and suppression by Mao Tse-tung's group is proof not of strength, but of weakness of Maoism, of its ideological, political and organizational crisis.

The materials of the 11th - Congress of the Communist Party of China demonstrate the intention of the Maoist leadership to continue using the concept of "struggle of two lines" in the Communist Party of China as an important tool for the ideological and political indoctrination of party members and the entire people in the spirit of Maoism, and for "historical justification" of an activity hostile to Marxism-Leninism both within China and on the international plane.

Following in Mao's footsteps, Hua Kuo-feng declared at the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China: "the struggle between the two classes...will take place many times in the future...this struggle will be protracted and tortuous and at times even very sharp."<sup>1</sup>

In this way the Maoists have admitted that the line of Mao is meeting with the constant resistance of the broad masses. No repressive campaigns, whatever their slogans, can suppress the dissatisfaction of China's working masses with Mao Tse-tung's adventurist line. The "struggle of two lines" in the Marxist view must necessarily lead to the victory of the Marxist-Leninist internationalist line in the Communist Party of China.

### "The Party Rules All"

"In our Party, is there not any situation in which there is another party outside the Party? I believe there is another party outside the Party."

Mao Tse-tung. Speech at the 11th plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

The Communist Party as a party of a new type is the

1. *Peking Review*, No. 35, August 1977, p. 39.

highest form of class organization of the working people, an instrument for the achievement and strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat. When it becomes the ruling party, it gives the people's struggle for the construction of socialism and communism an organized, planned and scientifically justified character. Party guidance covers most varied spheres of social life: the economy, social relations, politics, culture, ideology and international relations. As Leonid Brezhnev pointed out in the report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th Party Congress, "the party's guiding and mobilizing role is not an abstract conception. It is life itself, it is our day-to-day practice". That is why the assessment of the role of the party at the present stage is a fundamental issue of the revolutionary movement and of the construction of a new society. Today, too, it is also a key issue of the struggle between Marxists-Leninists and representatives of various forms of revisionism, including Maoism.

The Communist Party of China was founded in 1921. Its foundation was initially marked by a low number of working-class members, which at that time accounted for a mere 0.5 per cent of the population (1.5 million people).

Half of the Chinese proletariat worked at foreign enterprises where they were cruelly exploited by foreign capital. This led to an upsurge of anti-imperialist sentiments, but at the same time weakened the class antagonism between the proletariat and the national bourgeoisie. The workers also maintained close relations with the countryside, and this in turn contributed to the preservation of peasant, petty-bourgeois ideas in the minds of the proletariat.

Marxist literature was practically non-existent in China, and the first propagandists of Marxism had only vague ideas about scientific socialism.

One of the founders of the Communist Party of China, Chang Kuo-tao, recalls: "Most of my comrades were provincial scholars who confused ideas of utopian socialism and anarchism...They did not recognize Party discipline, study, strict secrecy, ideological unity."<sup>1</sup>

1. Chang Kuo-tao, *Formation of the Communist Party of China*, Vol. I, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 6 (in Russian).



The establishment of the Communist Party of China marked merely the beginning of an organized study of Marxist theory, its practical mastering and application to Chinese reality.

As a result, strong nationalist and sectarian tendencies began to manifest themselves in the Communist Party of China from the very beginning. In the struggle against these tendencies, a class-conscious, proletarian political line began to form in the Communist Party of China whose followers defended the creation of a disciplined proletarian party, capable of action and oriented mainly to the working class.

From the very first days of the Communist Party of China, Chinese communists were given great assistance by the Comintern, which helped to create a firm Marxist core in the party. With the help of the Comintern, the Communist Party of China approached the solution of the problems of the Chinese revolution from basically correct Marxist positions. In its internal life, the party was guided by the principle of democratic centralism. The proportion of proletarians in the party increased from year to year: by 1927 it had 58,000 members, half of them workers.

In 1927, after the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek coup, the Communist Party of China was severely attacked by the new regime. Its membership dropped to 10,000. The party lost the backbone of its working-class cadres and was forced underground. The result was a substantial weakening of the party's activity in the towns. The bulk of the party work shifted to remote country areas, which remained under the control of the Communist Party of China. The party was divorced from the working class and began to be swelled from the ranks of the peasantry, which led to the creation of the "peasant" line at the expense of the priority of proletarian aims in the revolution.

Later, when the main attention of the international communist movement was focused on the struggle against fascism, international relations of the Communist Party of China were weakened. Conditions were created for the petty-bourgeois nationalist line to come to the fore in the Communist Party of China, a line that was actively pursued by Mao Tse-tung. Even then, Mao Tse-tung used his principle "the Party rules

all" as a weapon in the bitter struggle against all who disagreed with his "thoughts", both inside and outside the party. This became patently evident in the so-called "rectification campaign" conducted from the autumn of 1941 to 1945.

The 7th Congress of the Communist Party of China (1945), which was conducted in the spirit of Mao's personality cult and approved "Mao Tse-tung's thoughts" as the ideological platform of the party, formally sanctioned the victory of the petty-bourgeois nationalists.

Even after the victory of people's power, the party remained predominantly peasant; only 6.5 per cent of its membership were workers in 1953.

But the situation in the country and the revolutionary enthusiasm of the Chinese people during the first five-year plan periods forced the petty-bourgeois nationalists to remain in the mainstream of revolutionary struggle.

Under the influence of the Marxist-Leninist wing in the party, the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China approved a provision on party leadership, which said: "The Central Committee guides the activities of central state institutions and people's organizations of national importance through Party groups in these institutions and organizations".

However, this formulation did not suit Mao Tse-tung, because in matters of party leadership the formula "All are subordinated to the Party" was more suited to his despotic methods, since he considered himself to be the party.

Immediately after the 8th Congress, Mao Tse-tung began to gather for a new attack on the party in order to impose upon it his ideas as an ideological platform and to make it a docile mechanism that would obey his every instruction. When he addressed the Supreme State Conference in February 1957, Mao Tse-tung put forward a platform which diverted the party from the tasks of socio-economic construction set by the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China.

The 8th Congress had set forth the task of consolidating the economic foundations of socialism as the basic objective. Mao, on his part, declared ideological and political struggle to be the main content of social development in the People's Republic of China. He asserted that the primary prerequisite for the



elimination of the exploiter classes was the ideological, not economic, factor and that the question whether or not socialism would survive in China depended squarely on ideology.

Having narrowed the sphere of the party's effort in building socialism, Mao undermined its position as the guiding political force in the country and provoked the masses to fight against "party bureaucratism".

By forcing the "hundred flowers" line on the party, which allowed free criticism of Marxism and bourgeois propaganda, and by legalizing the actions of bourgeois Right-wing elements against the ideological foundations of socialism in China, Mao exposed the party to a direct attack by the bourgeoisie.

Mao adopted these measures to undermine the Communist Party of China and disrupt its ideological unity achieved on the basis of the decisions of the 8th Congress, in order to bolster his own position in the party and the state. But since his positions were in sharp conflict with the principles of Marxism-Leninism, Mao put the question of a fundamental change in the nature of the party on the agenda.

To achieve this Mao Tse-tung started the "cultural revolution" in the course of which he actually created a new, Maoist, party. This process was confirmed officially at the 9th and 10th Congresses of the Communist Party of China. The 9th Party Congress, held in 1969, adopted new party Rules, which repudiated the former definition of the main tasks of the party in the construction of a socialist economy and culture, the continuous raising of the people's standard of living, the development and perfection of socialist democracy, and the implementation of a socialist foreign policy. The Maoists rejected the former theses on democratic centralism, the development of inner-party democracy, and the need to fight nationalism and great-power chauvinism.

The official endorsement of Mao Tse-tung's ideas and of the basic aspects of his political line as the programmatic and organizational principles of the party formed the essence of the new party Rules. The main purpose of the Rules was to transform the party into an instrument "implementing Mao Tse-tung's thoughts," into a docile tool of his personal power.

The entire leadership of the party, the government and the army was centred in the hands of Mao and a small group of people devoted to him. This was the practical implementation of the Maoist principle "the party rules all".

The bitter factional struggle inside the Communist Party of China after the death of Mao Tse-tung demonstrated once again that "party unity", which the Maoists harped on at the 9th and 10th Congresses, was a total fiction. In his report to the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China, Hua Kuo-feng had to admit that "such bourgeois styles of work as alienation from the masses, recourse to deception, trimming and political speculation have developed in our Party."<sup>1</sup>

The new Rules of the Communist Party of China adopted by the 11th Congress continue the line of the 9th and 10th Maoist congresses. They are permeated by a petty-bourgeois, chauvinist spirit, and are completely based on the notorious "thoughts of Mao", which are presented as "the guiding ideology and theoretical basis of the Communist Party of China".<sup>2</sup> The amendments made in the Rules are conspicuously directed against the influence of the "gang of four" and their followers in the party.

The new Rules, which reduce the principle of democratic centralism to unconditional subjugation, show that the leaders of the Communist Party of China have no intention whatsoever of restoring the Leninist principles of party leadership. They neglect, among other things, the principle of electing all guiding bodies from the lowest to the highest. The new Rules officially consolidate the power of a small minority of Maoist leaders over the 35 million members of the party. Party "democracy" in the new Rules has been cut down to vague Maoist stereotypes for guiding the conduct of communists, such as "Say all you know and say it without reserve. Blame not the speaker but be warned by his words."<sup>3</sup> Interpreting these ambiguous Maoist incantations, the Vice-Chairman of the Communist Party of China, Yeh Chien-ying, noted that the party leadership intended to "settle controversial issues among

1. *Peking Review*, No. 35, August 1977, p. 47.

2. *Peking Review*, No. 36, p. 16.

3. *Peking Review*, No. 36, p. 30.



the people" in this way. It is quite obvious that such an interpretation of inner-party democracy gives wide scope for carrying out reprisals against those who, from the point of view of the leadership, "do not tell the truth", "are not repentant", etc., and creates a legal basis for new purges in the party. The new Rules of the Communist Party of China demand, even more than those adopted by the 9th and 10th Congresses, that party members be obedient tools in the hands of the present leaders of the People's Republic of China.

The practical application in China of the Maoist principle "the Party rules all" testifies to the demagogic character of this slogan. In spite of repeated claims that "the Communist Party of China is the controlling centre of all Chinese people", that "the Party rules all", the party leadership takes it out of the party as soon as it sees that the policy and "thoughts" of the "great helmsman" do not meet with the approval of its members.

Like Mao Tse-tung, Hua Kuo-feng and his partners in the party leadership do not believe in the guiding force of the party, do not believe that the party can lead the masses, and therefore impose and dictate from above the duty to "submit to the single leadership of the Party".

In the present situation in China, party leaders either substitute administrative executives or combine party and administrative functions, which practice has led to the emergence of a state-party system in which the party, having secured a monopoly of political power, substitutes the state apparatus as well.

After the "cultural revolution" the implementation of the slogan "the Party rules all" was entrusted to provincial party committees newly created by the army. When these party committees were set up, 22 out of 29 first secretaries were military men. Sixty per cent of the 158 leading members of the party committees were servicemen. Contrary to the generally accepted norms of democratic centralism, strict military discipline based on unconditional obedience was introduced in the party bodies. As was admitted by the Chinese press, party committees were turned into forums of "only one speaker", i.e., the first secretary. The army gained great power in the

provinces. This state of affairs has prevailed to this day.

The documents adopted by the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China make no mention of who charts the course and policy of the party: instead the documents say that primary organizations are pledged "to propagate and carry out the line, policies and decisions of the Party". This shows that the whole party policy continues to be determined by a small group of supreme leaders headed by Hua Kuo-feng, who, in full conformity with the dogmas of Maoism, has replaced the dictatorship of a class with the dictatorship of a small group of people divorced from the party.

The party has thus been turned into an isolated force standing above the working class and acting as the dictator of all the people and the entire state.

### "Politics is the Guiding Force"

"What is most important is whether or not the ideological and political line is correct. If it is correct, everything will become available—men, arms, power. But if the line is incorrect, everything can be lost. A line is a link by which the whole chain can be pulled..."

Mao Tse-tung. Speech made during an inspection trip around the country, September 12, 1971.

Since 1955, driven by ambitions of personal hegemony in the world revolutionary movement, Mao Tse-tung sought to replace the general line of the party by a new line aimed at placing China ahead of all the socialist countries in a single leap. In forcing this line upon the party, he proclaimed the slogan of politics being the "guiding force".

Whereas Marxist-Leninist theory views the mode of production as a dialectical unity of the productive forces and production relations, this unity is blurred in Mao Tse-tung's concept. He believes that it is possible to consolidate socialist production relations, and even to transform them into communist relations, without relying on an appropriate development of the productive forces. Mao Tse-tung's view is that the development of socialist production relations does not require the



creation of the necessary material conditions, but needs decrees, directives and other political measures which force the masses to observe these commands obediently.

The general line originally drawn up by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China envisaged the gradual realization of socialist transformations in the country within about 15 years. In 1956, Mao Tse-tung issued an order to reduce the period of transition to socialism to one-third.

The Maoists "bolstered" the concept of absolute power of politics by making the role of the subjective factor in economic primary; its role did indeed grow under socialism, because socialism, with its scientific and planned economy, makes it increasingly possible to guide the economic development of society in a purposeful way. But whereas Marxism aims at securing the participation of the broad masses in economic activity, the Maoists see the force of the subjective factor in the obedient fulfilment by the mass of the people of the commands of a single man, the "leader", the "genius". The practical consequence of this policy is that political coercion and adventurism in dealing with economic matters by means of "leaps" and "cultural revolutions" become the basic methods of economic management.

In the period of the "great leap" (1958-1962), the planned approach in the development of the economy was rejected, and plans were described as a factor which "hampers the initiative of the masses". Disregard for the principal economic laws in the period of the "great leap" caused chaos in China's economy.

After a short period of economic "stabilization" which followed the period of the "great leap", the "cultural revolution" broke out. And again Mao Tse-tung's subjectivism and arbitrariness led the Chinese economy to bankruptcy: the country's development was thrown back many years.

The content of the Maoist slogan "Politics is the guiding force" altered according to changes in the domestic political situation. In the periods of the "great leap" and "people's communes", politics was regarded as an element of production called upon to "make up for" the shortage of labour and material resources, "rectify" miscalculations in planning, etc.

In the periods of "stabilization" Maoist propaganda intentionally opposed "politics" to "economics". By emphasizing the priority of politics the Maoists sought to belittle the role of material-production activity in the life of the society.

At each stage of the aggravation of the Maoist-inspired "class struggle", the slogan "Politics is the guiding force" served to discredit advocates of a realistic economic policy. This was the case with the denouncement of the economic policy pursued by Liu Shao-chi, who was accused of, among other things, violating the principle of "Politics is the guiding force". A similar case is that of Teng Hsiao-ping, a prominent figure in the Communist Party of China. In 1976, Teng put forward a thesis, termed "three directives form the decisive link" by Chinese propaganda, in which he used separate "sublime instructions" of Mao about the "class struggle", "stability and cohesion", and the "need for China's economic growth" in an attempt to reach a solution to the country's economic problems. This attempt was severely rebuked by Mao Tse-tung, who exclaimed: "What does 'three directives form the decisive link' mean? Stabilization and cohesion do not mean rejection of the class struggle. The class struggle is the most decisive link, and the rest of the chain depends on it." Teng was accused of "placing politics and economics on the same level", "propagating eclecticism", and trying to build "goulash communism" in China. (That is how Chinese propaganda scorns any attempt to draw attention to the grim material condition of the people.)

After the death of Mao Tse-tung the country's economic plight was appalling. The new Chinese leaders had to admit that the country was on the verge of disaster. According to the estimates of the Chinese press, the overall volume of industrial production had dropped steeply. Coal output slumped; steel output fell from 25 to 21 million tons; the production of machine tools and motor vehicles declined sharply. The Chinese press was flooded with materials about the lamentable state of different branches of the economy.

The *Jenmin jihpao* wrote that the number of tractors which the Kiangsi and Loyang tractor plants failed to build could have met the requirements of a province with a population of 30 to



40 million.<sup>1</sup> The same newspaper reported that the Hangchow silk-weaving mill stood idle for 20 months in the last three years, and that the losses thus incurred amounted to a sum equal to the cost of two such mills.<sup>2</sup>

The situation in agriculture was no better. In 1976 agricultural production was down five per cent. Peking had to increase the import of foodstuffs and purchase 22 million tons of grain from the United States, Canada and other countries.

Serious difficulties arose in transport and finance as well.

While admitting that the country was faced with serious economic problems, the new leadership of the People's Republic of China has been trying to blame them on the economic policy allegedly pursued by the "gang of four". Yet it is perfectly clear that these leaders of the Communist Party of China did not have an independent policy. The economic plight of the past years is the result of the implementation of Mao's directives, including his thesis that "politics is the guiding force".

In an attempt to normalize the situation Hua Kuo-feng has set the task of "bringing about great order across the land" and "stimulating the development of production".

However, the country's new leadership is still tackling problems of economic development by means of political dictate. "Tremendous power can be generated once we grasp the major class struggle to expose and criticize the gang...",<sup>3</sup> Hua Kuo-feng exclaimed from the rostrum of the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China.

What is required from the working people of China is unconditional fulfilment of all additional production assignments from above, regardless of whether real conditions exist for carrying them out. Appealing to nationalist sentiments, *Jenmin jihpao* wrote: "The Chinese people are capable of doing what other peoples are incapable of doing...While others make one step we make ten."<sup>4</sup>

The new leadership requires the working people to "spend less money and do great deeds, not to spend any at all and still

1. *Jenmin jihpao*, May 30, 1977, p. 1.

2. *ibid.*, April 24, 1977, p. 2.

3. *Peking Review*, No. 35, p. 49.

4. *Jenmin jihpao*, April, 18, 1977, p. 2.

get things done", "within 480 minutes, which is eight hours, to do a job which takes 700 minutes<sup>2</sup>", etc.

The practical use of the slogan "politics is the guiding force" demonstrates that, following Mao Tse-tung, the new leaders of China deviate from the materialist rationalization of the economic policy, reject the Marxist-Leninist method of analyzing the state of the economy and the alignment of class forces, and ignore the ample experience of other socialist states. Production relations are still regarded as an object of arbitrary administrative measures, as a utilitarian means of solving subjectively assigned tasks.

And these tasks have remained unchanged. Above all, they include the building up of the military, missile-nuclear potential of the country and the development of related industries in order to attain the chauvinistic and hegemonic aims of the construction of a "Greater China".

The principle that "politics is the guiding force" is unscientific, reactionary and designed to encourage the use of brute force in the economy.

### The "Great Leap"

"We cannot take the old road of developing technology, which all countries took; we cannot crawl in the tracks of others. We must break the fixed norms..

"This is the meaning of what we call the great leap. Is it unfeasible? Maybe this is boasting and bragging? No, it is quite feasible, and this is not boasting and bragging..."

Mao Tse-tung, Speech at a session of the 3rd National People's Congress, December 1964

Mao Tse-tung's followers described him as the "greatest Marxist of our time". How far from Marxism-Leninism Mao Tse-tung actually is can be seen from his attitude towards the objective laws governing the socialist mode of production. He regarded socialist production as the realm of spontaneity.

1. *Jenmin jihpao*, June 24, 1977, p. 2.

2. *ibid.* June 22, 1977, p. 1.



Other "laws", those which he invented himself, are recognized by Mao Tse-tung. Prominent among them is the so-called law of economic development by "waves" and "leaps", which was officially proclaimed at the second session of the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China in May 1958.

According to this "law", a specific feature of socialist reproduction is a constant emergence of disequilibrium in the economy, its development by "waves" in accordance with the formula: "High tide—low tide—higher tide—that means a leap".

With this "law" the Maoists try to "explain" the high and low tides in the growth rate of production in the past 15 years of the development of the People's Republic of China.

"In our work, we always advance by waves and not along a direct line. We must take this into consideration in drawing up the plans. The development by waves is an objective rule, an objective law," Mao Tse-tung said in April 1959.

The realization of Mao Tse-tung's economic concept began with the destruction of the "old frame-work" of the First Five-Year Plan. Petty-bourgeois impatience and hegemonic ambitions were elevated by the Maoists to principles of economic policy. Mao Tse-tung decided to "spur" the progress in the first years of the Five-Year Plan in China. The plan targets for 1956 for the volume of capital construction and industrial production were substantially raised. At the same time, collectivization of agriculture was greatly accelerated. This experiment, as subsequent events demonstrated, was in the nature of a rehearsal of the "great leap".

The slogan, "To achieve in three years changes in the appearance of most areas of the country", proclaimed in 1958, clearly showed the Maoists' arbitrary approach to the problems of growth rates. Mao Tse-tung succeeded in forcing the second session of the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China to accept the "new general line of the Party".

The Second Five-Year Plan approved at the first session of the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1956 was described as "conservative" two years later. The leadership of the Communist Party of China decided to increase gross industrial production 6.5 times in the five-year period (average annual growth rate of 45 per cent), and agricultural production 2.5

times (average annual growth rate of 20 per cent). Steel output was to increase in five years from 5.4 million tons to 80-100 million tons a year, coal output was to reach 700 million tons in 1962 (a 5.4-fold growth over 1957), production of electricity was to increase 12.4 times, to 240,000 million kilowatt hours. Five thousand large industrial enterprises were to be built. Whereas the earlier proclaimed task was to catch up with and overtake Great Britain economically in 15 or more years, it was decided a few months later to achieve this objective in five years, or even sooner.

The political meaning of the "new general line" was this: the Chinese people were to be convinced that the transition to communism would come in the nearest future, through "development by leaps". The task was set to skip the stage which had not yet been achieved—socialism—and to proceed directly to communism, which was first to be built in rural areas. The primary condition for the building of communism was not the growth of the productive forces, but an artificial change in production relations from collective ownership to ownership by all the people. A faster rate of economic growth was to be achieved not by a higher technical standard of production, but exclusively by the enthusiastic labour of the masses, above all the peasantry.

"Several years of hard work, and ten thousand years of happiness" were promised to the Chinese people by Mao Tse-tung. These promises were doomed to remain unfulfilled. The result of the policy of the "great leap" and the "people's communes" was a deep crisis in the country. Instead of enjoying "ten thousand years of happiness" the people suffered from hunger and privations as a result of the economic chaos. Mass laying up of plants built in the "leap" years began; capital construction in industry and transport as well as housing construction were halted. Mao Tse-tung placed the blame for all this on lower cadres who "failed to address themselves in a creative way" to his "thoughts". Those who expressed doubts about the theory of development "by leaps" and who were against "rush-work methods" and "leaps" in work were criticized especially sharply. They were branded as opportunists and conservatives "without revolutionary boldness, who are glad when life flows



steadily and evenly".

At the 8th plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, held in August 1959, the adventurist ideas of Mao Tse-tung's "great leap" were opposed by Political Bureau member and Defence Minister Peng Te-huai, Alternate Member of the Political Bureau and Deputy Foreign Minister Chang Wen-tien, and other prominent communists.

In his "Letter of 11,000 Hieroglyphs", Peng Tehuai wrote: "The 'great leap' has brought about a widespread epidemic of window-dressing. The newspapers carry reports about incredible miracles. The 'leap' has caused disproportions in the state economy and created a mess everywhere. At every step we see manifestations of petty-bourgeois impulsiveness and disregard for economic laws. The slogan 'Politics is the guiding force' cannot replace economic laws and concrete economic measures." Peng Te-huai and those who shared his views were removed from the political scene and later subjected to reprisals.

Even though the 8th Central Committee plenum, as its resolutions show, revised many of the Maoist concepts, Mao and his group continued to defend the theory of "development by waves", because they regarded it as an important method of practical activity which made it possible deliberately to "create in various areas of work on the construction of socialism one leap after another".

This thesis of Mao Tse-tung, an eclectic conglomeration in which the concepts of Marxist-Leninist science are distorted and intertwined with terms and notions from anarchic theories, remained the theoretical foundation for explaining the unsuccessful attempts to speed up the growth rates of the country's development during the "cultural revolution" and in the subsequent period. And the present disastrous state of the national economy of the People's Republic of China is a direct result of the implementation of Mao Tse-tung's directives.

Today the new leaders of China are trying to find a way out of the economic *impasse* by defending the old adventurist Maoist line of carrying out "leaps". They seek to combine the incompatible—the chaos of the "leap" and a planned and proportional development of the economy, the grandiose tasks of achieving an all-round modernization of the economy with a

crude, mercilessly exhausting method of "relying on one's own forces". "A new leap forward is taking shape in the national economy," Hua Kuo-feng told the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China. But while Mao demanded that Great Britain be overtaken within five years, the present Chinese leaders are now setting the task of surpassing the United States. "It is necessary to take America as a target and to overtake it," *Jenmin jihpao* wrote on May 11, 1977. "The great victory attained in routing the 'gang of four' has created the conditions for a new leap...which will surpass the 1958 leap in scale. We must stand firmly in the forefront of the movement and, be with those who stimulate 'the great leap'."

The Japanese newspaper *Sankei Shimbun* noted:

"The Chinese leadership is calling for the US level to be reached. This is not a simple task for China which has a population of more than 800 million, nearly four times as large as that of the United States. In terms of gross national product, China will have to increase its economic might by more than 30 times in order to catch up with the United States, provided US economic growth rate is 'zero' until the 21st century."<sup>1</sup>

In practice these Maoist plans are unrealizable, especially since the methods which the Maoists intend to use to tackle such tremendous tasks are based on obsolete Maoist dogmas which have long since been refuted by life, such as intensification of labour, longer working hours without additional pay and monstrous overstraining of the working people. Hua Kuo-feng calls on the people of China to "carry cargoes on their shoulders when there are no mechanical devices", to "start a revolution with five spades", and to adhere strictly to the ten Maoist precepts (the "ten don'ts"): "Don't be afraid of difficulties, don't be afraid of death, don't seek personal glory, don't seek profit, don't pay attention to working conditions, don't pay attention to the duration of work, don't expect reward, don't consider your professional status, don't confine yourself to the range of your duties, don't worry about whether this is the front or the rear".

Today's Chinese propaganda slogans are strikingly similar to

1. *Sankei Shimbun*, May 12, 1977.



those of the 1958 period: "It is better to live twenty years less than to be an old buffalo all one's life", "Cover a three-step path in two steps", etc. The present leaders intend to organize even the "socialist emulation" of working people in the Maoist way, which, according to the Chinese press, means "competing mainly in revolutionary character—to compare ideology, energy, style of work, personal qualities..." Moreover, the Peking propagandists speculate on the sense of national pride of the Chinese, claiming that "while others make one step we make ten".

It is symptomatic that the Peking leaders more and more often link the tasks of economic construction and acceleration of the rates of the country's development with war. Recently Hua Kuo-feng said bluntly: "The question of growth rates is not a purely economic issue; it is an important political problem...we must by all means get ready to fight".<sup>1</sup>

The new "Maoist leap" ultimately boils down to securing as much funds as possible at the expense of extreme overstraining of the toiling people in order to build up the military potential and prepare for war.

Evidently, the lessons of the past have not taught Mao's successors anything.

### "To Rely on One's Own Forces"

"All provinces must create their own war industry. Funds must be squeezed out of industry, agriculture, the cultural and educational sphere..."

Mao Tse-tung. "On the Third Five-Year Plan", June 1964

The construction of socialism requires maximum mobilization of all the internal resources of the country: securing the necessary reserves, persistent and dedicated work, and thrifty organization of economic management. Soviet people built the first socialist state in the world under extremely complicated conditions, and relied solely on their own strength.

But when Mao Tse-tung coined the slogan "To rely on

1. *Jenmin jihpao*, May 13, 1977.

one's own forces", his intention was to free the central authorities as much as possible from the need to make investments in agriculture and local industry, and to spend as much as possible on the building of a large-scale war industry.

From the economic point of view, this leads to a partition of the country as a single economic organism into regional self-sufficient economic entities, to the predominance of small-scale cottage industry, which restricts the development of commodity-money relations and concentration and cooperation in production.

In an attempt to translate his ideas into reality, Mao Tse-tung proclaimed in 1958 the course of establishing "people's communes" in Chinese villages; in accordance with the theory of "relying on one's own forces", they were to combine different functions in one social cell by amalgamating industry, agriculture, trade, education and military affairs; every member of the commune was to be a peasant and a worker, a soldier and a tradesman at the same time. In 1959, the Maoists tried to extend this system to the cities, and began to establish people's communes there. All relations between individual economic units were limited to the minimum. This meant actual abandonment of specialization and cooperation, and led to economic stagnation.

The line "To rely on one's own forces" was also used to prevent peasants from asking for aid. Another feature of this line were the slogans: "Do not hold out your hand to the state for help", and "Three things are not asked for" (the state was not to be asked for grain, money and materials, not even in the event of the natural disasters).

The Maoist press wrote that "to rely on one's own forces" was the principal line of the state in socialist construction. It can be applied everywhere. Every enterprise, every industry without exception must implement the line "to rely on one's own forces."

Later, especially at the time of the "cultural revolution", this line was confirmed by a series of new reforms whereby elementary education, medical care and trade in the rural areas were handed over to the people's communes. The Maoist leadership thus virtually freed the central state agencies of



responsibility for subsidizing these services in the villages.

The 10th Congress of the Communist Party of China publicized the principle of "reliance on one's own forces" and put special emphasis on the need to introduce everywhere what it called the experience of the Taching oil fields<sup>1</sup> and the Tachai production brigade<sup>2</sup>, which were described as new models in fulfilling the slogan "to rely on one's own forces".

The economic essence of the "Taching experience" is that when a modern industrial enterprise is built, funds are spent exclusively for production purposes, and wage costs are reduced to the minimum. Production is expanded through higher intensity of work; material incentives are abolished, and questions of raising the standard of living are not even considered.

The "Tachai experience" means that communes and brigades should hand over the maximum to the central authorities and are expected to develop agricultural production virtually without any funding by the state.

However, the tasks relating to the development of modern industry and modernization of agriculture cannot be solved solely on the basis of the principle of "reliance on one's own forces". It is no coincidence that present-day China has a very low productivity in industry and agriculture. A national conference

1. The Taching oil fields, employing about 100,000 people, are the largest in China, located in the main oil region in the country. "To learn from Taching" is a slogan which has been in force in industry since 1964, when it was proclaimed by Mao Tse-tung. It is required to learn from Taching how to ensure growth of production through intensified work, without any material incentive. The experience of Taching envisages "achievement of the highest possible production indicators at rationally low wages". The work is organized "on the pattern of military units". Members of families are included in the "working army". Housewives must engage in agriculture and ancillary crafts. Workers and members of their families build their own homes from clay and straw.

The experience of Taching is presented as "the road of China's industrialization through relying on one's own forces".

2. The Tachai production brigade, founded in the mountain district of Siyan in Shensi province in 1959, has 360 members. It has 55 hectares of plough-land; the fields are on mountain slopes. The brigade mainly cultivated grain. Upto 60 per cent of the crop is turned over to the state. The earnings per brigade member, including payment in kind and benefits from public funds, amount to the negligible sum of 9-10 yuan a month. Spendings on cultural and social needs are almost nil.

on agriculture, which was held in Tachai<sup>3</sup> in 1975, called upon the entire country to take the Tachai road, but was forced to admit the grave situation in agriculture.

The Taching and Tachai systems are not only economically enviable, but also lead to the impoverishment of the social and economic life of society. The political and cultural horizon of the working people is circumscribed by the framework of the "self-sufficient unit", and all sense of the common class and social interests of the working people is lost.

As we know, the exchange of products between town and country, between industry and agriculture, constitutes the economic basis of the alliance of the workers and peasants. But to follow in the footsteps of Tachai undermines that basis because, as we have noted, these are economically closed units which provide for their own needs in agricultural produce as well as in industrial goods. Reliance is therefore placed not on mutual cooperation and support between the working class and the peasantry, but on a utopian concept of overcoming distinctions between them mechanically, according to the formula "be a worker and a peasant at the same time". This is precisely what is meant by the Maoists' "districts of a new type" where "workers merge with peasants and towns with villages".

This Maoist concept of "reliance on one's own forces" is fully accepted by the new leadership of China. As the proceedings of conferences on spreading the experience of Taching and Tachai, at which Hua Kuo-feng presided, clearly prove, emphasis is still placed not on the modernization of agriculture but on making "all districts use local resources to the full and develop small industrial enterprises as much as possible". As an example Chinese propaganda has recently stressed the district of Siyan where state allocations over ten years amounted to no more than 11 per cent of the expenditure on the mechanization of agriculture.

The 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China passed a resolution which says that it is necessary to "turn one-third of our country's enterprises into Taching-type enterprises and one-third of our counties into Tachai-type counties in the period of the Fifth Five-Year Plan". "Aiming high means going in



for revolution and construction in the Taching and Tachai ways," Hua Kuo-feng told the Congress.

Thus the economic programme of the new leadership of China remains based on this harmful concept of Mao Tse-tung.

The policy of "reliance on one's own forces" has another aspect. As the Peking leadership deviates from the principles of Marxism-Leninism, Chinese propaganda uses the slogan "To rely on one's own forces" to denigrate the Soviet Union's assistance to China, and to justify China's rejection of economic cooperation with the socialist countries. Using the formula "reliance on one's own forces", the Maoists are fundamentally reorienting the country's external economic relations. The share of capitalist countries in China's foreign trade increased to 84.6 per cent in 1976.

This "reliance" on the forces of imperialism required, to put it mildly, commentary.

At the first session of the 4th National People's Congress, Chou En-lai in his report on the activities of the government interpreted the foreign-policy aspect of the slogan "To rely on one's own forces" as follows: "To rely mainly on our own forces and also ask for foreign aid...that is our line." But the foreign-trade practices of the People's Republic of China show that the most important industrial projects are now being built mainly with the help of capitalist countries, which supply credit, complete equipment and experts. In the last few years China has bought complete equipment for a number of industrial enterprises, costing several thousand million dollars, in the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, Holland and Japan. China also buys such important items as rolled stock, pipes, aircraft and instruments. Nevertheless, Maoist propaganda describes all big projects built with foreign aid as evidence of the victory of the principle of "relying on one's own forces".

The Maoists particularly urge the Third World countries to "rely on their own forces", thus trying to undermine relations between the developing countries and the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. The Chinese leadership also presses its economic aid upon the developing

countries, which does not strengthen their economic independence, but ties them politically to Peking.

From the domestic-policy viewpoint, the slogan "To rely on one's own forces" grossly violates the socialist principles of economic management, and from the point of view of foreign policy it is used in the anti-Soviet campaign and to pursue the Maoists' hegemonic aims.

### "Power Grows out of the Barrel of a Gun"

"Everything in Yen-an<sup>1</sup> has been created by having gun's. All things grow out of the barrel of a gun."

Mao Tse-tung. Talk with Andre Malraux, August 1965.

The spirit of militarism, based on the thesis that a new world war is inevitable and even desirable, has today penetrated all spheres of life in the People's Republic of China—its politics, economy and culture. "Power grows out of the barrel of a gun", "The whole country must learn from the People's Liberation Army"—everyone in China knows these utterances of Mao Tse-tung.

The long struggle waged by Chinese communists against counter-revolution resulted in a degree of militarization in the areas under the control of the Communist Party of China. During the existence of "liberated areas", military commanders frequently also held posts in party and administrative bodies. All party work was confined to the army. The principles of inner-Party democracy and democratic forms gave way to the military style of work and to military discipline, which were extended to public life. The objective conditions prevailing at that time eminently suited Mao Tse-tung's ambitious plans.

In 1927, he formed his own armed unit in the Chinkanshan mountains, not so much in order to fight the enemies of the revolution as to consolidate his influence in the area. In the region controlled by the unit the army replaced public

1. A town in northern Shensi province where the Communist Party of China Central Committee and the Chinese Red Army Command were stationed in 1936-1947.



organizations and local party committees; military discipline replaced party discipline, and executions were frequently used to punish comrades who made mistakes.

Mao Tse-tung's authority as a party leader was then by no means high, and he needed to strengthen his influence in the army to establish his control over the party.

To a certain degree, this control was established in 1930, when Mao Tse-tung forcibly dissolved the party committee in the Kiangsi province and gave dictatorial powers to the front-line committee which was under his personal control. An order issued by Mao Tse-tung said: "From now on, all military, political and Party affairs will be dealt with by the frontline committee in which all guidance will be centred."

Mao Tse-tung used almost the same methods in 1935, when he gathered several dozen military men loyal to him in the small town of Tsunyi, and conducted the so-called "enlarged session of the Political Bureau", after which he assumed the leadership of the Communist Party of China.

When Mao Tse-tung sought to provide theoretical justification for his activities, he wrote in his *Problems of War and Strategy* in 1938:

"Every Communist must grasp the truth, 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun...' Having guns, we can create Party organizations...We can also...create schools, create culture and mass movements...All things grow out of the barrel of a gun."<sup>1</sup>

After the victory of the people's revolution in China, Mao continued to give the army control over all aspects of state and public affairs. Military control bodies—military-administrative committees—were formed in territories, large administrative districts and cities freed of the enemy. These committees continued to exist even after the adoption of the People's Republic of China's Constitution in 1954, which abolished military control.

The "special line" of building socialism in China which Mao Tse-tung advanced in the 1950s was also aimed at converting the whole country into one huge militarized commune,

1. Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Military Writings*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1967, pp. 274-275.

and at extending military forms of organization to all strata of the population. It was proposed that extensive military measures be introduced in industry, offices, schools and colleges, etc.

At the same time a broad ideological indoctrination of the army was conducted to implant the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung". Ranks were abolished in the army, as were many former benefits enjoyed by servicemen, and some experienced officers who stood in Mao's way were removed from their posts. Mao Tse-tung did this in order to make the army more dependent on his personal power.

The slogan "Power grows out of the barrel of a gun" was revived during the "cultural revolution". At first, the main force in the reprisals and party purges were the "hungweipings", then the army appeared on the scene, to "take away" power from those who had received it from the people. The decision of August 23, 1967, passed by the Military Council of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China led by Mao Tse-tung, read:

"The People's Army must support the broad masses of the Left. The so-called 'non-intervention' is fictitious since the army has already joined the struggle. All former instructions that the army is not to intervene in the cultural revolution are cancelled..."

It is no coincidence that in *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung*, published in 1967, which was the Bible of the "hungweipings", the slogan "Power grows out of the barrel of a gun" was included as one of the principal commandments.

It was by the power of the gun that Mao Tse-tung succeeded in smashing party committees and state bodies throughout the country, and in forming "revolutionary committees"—administrative bodies which were not authorized by the Constitution then in force.

The increased role of the gun was ideologically substantiated by Lin Biao at the 9th Congress of the Communist Party of China, when he said, referring to Mao Tse-tung, that "from the viewpoint of Marxism, the army is the main element in the state".

The people's army in a socialist state is really one of the



sure safeguards of proletarian dictatorship, ensuring the defence of the socialist countries against imperialist aggression. But to present it as the "main element" of the socialist state, to transform it into "a tool promoting industry, agriculture, and the broad masses of the Left", to give it the function of "military control" over the entire life of the country and of the "military-political training" of all people is to forego Marxism and betray it, to change the socialist state into a military-bureaucratic system.

The Maoists did not hide their view that the army is the main instrument of state power, which is to "serve as a weapon for suppression and coercion."<sup>1</sup> The role of the army as a punitive body was considerably expanded in the new Constitution of the People's Republic of China, which specified that Mao Tse-tung himself was the supreme commander of all armed forces. The army was also characterized as a "work echelon" and as a "production echelon". Military units were specially assigned to "mobilize" peasants for sowing and harvest; representatives of the army in factories interfered in production activities, and even "conducted investigations." Everywhere so-called "army agitation brigades" were busy detecting "class enemies"; special military representatives supervised the work of young people sent to the rural areas.

A special role was given to the army in organizing political campaigns in the country, and in direct suppression of those dissatisfied with the regime, as was the case during workers' strikes in Hangchow in 1974, and at the mass demonstration on Tienanmen Square on April 5, 1976.

The new leadership of the Communist Party of China headed by Hua Kuo-feng, which came to power after the death of Mao Tse-tung, has fully accepted his precept on the use of the gun in fighting for power. The support of the military helped Hua Kuo-feng to get rid of the so-called "gang of four". "The army", *Hungchi* wrote, "is a monolith standing in the way of all vermin. It blocked the way of careerists and conspirators who had slipped into the Party and made them tremble." The periodical also noted, addressing the army: "In

1. *Hungchi*, No. 3, 1972.

the past we listened to Chairman Mao in all matters. After the death of Mao we must listen to our wise leader, Chairman Hua, in all our acts."<sup>1</sup>

The criticism of the "four" carried on for many months has disclosed the methods which the Maoists frequently use in fighting for power in the army. It is noted in particular that the "gang of four", "on their own behalf, distributed letters in military units, gave instructions, and made decisions on important matters". "They," *Hungchi* complained of the "four", "organized underground military units and secret communication points, and replaced the leadership of party committees... Chiang Ching impudently declared: 'I must be in command of the army!' But in point of fact she had never held any post in the army, and laid false claim to the right to take over command of the army."<sup>2</sup>

However, the very methods which the Chinese Party propaganda condemns are being actively used today by the new leadership of the Communist Party of China.

In a letter published on June 10, 1977 in the central Chinese press to confirm their "allegiance" to Hua Kuo-feng, the soldiers and commanders of the exemplary 6th company declared: "We must wage a resolute struggle against those who, by their erroneous pronouncements or erroneous acts, impair the great image of Mao Tse-tung, those who betray the Party line." Such oaths are being given against a background of frenzied militarism and calls "to abandon illusions of peace", "to prepare for war", "to think about battles", and so forth. All this intensifies the atmosphere of fear, tension and lack of confidence in the future. The new leaders of China, following in Mao's footsteps, seek to transform the country into an "empire of fear" by their endless political campaigns, reprisals against dissenters, camps for the "re-education" of cadres, and public trials of the opponents of the regime. In these matters the gun indeed plays a major part.

1. *Hungchi*, No. 7, 1977.

2. *ibid.*



# “Line of the Masses”

“Napoleon had the best method. He dissolved all representative institutions and decided himself who should run the state together with him.”

Mao Tse-tung. Talk with Georges Pompidou, September 1973

The so-called “line of the masses” is a constant attribute of the Maoist ideological dogma.

“Take the ideas of the masses and concentrate them; then go to the masses, persevere in the ideas and carry them through, so as to form correct ideas of leadership—such is the basic method of leadership.”<sup>1</sup> These were the words used by Mao Tse-tung in 1943 to formulate this “line”.

Regardless of the apparent attractiveness and democratic character of such ideas, the “line of the masses” in Maoist practice is as demagogic as Mao Tse-tung’s other declarations.

The Chinese working people have been in a very difficult situation for many years now. The earnings of the peasants are much lower today than at the end of the 1950s. Constant requisitions in rural areas under a variety of militaristic slogans condemn peasant families to semi-starvation. The peasants’ just demands for remuneration according to agricultural production turned out by them are described as “bourgeois anachronisms” and as “manifestations of capitalism”. Even old people who have worked their whole lives in the countryside are forced to bend their backs until death for a piece of bread. According to some estimates, approximately a quarter of the peasant families in the country are unable to feed themselves. Under the new leadership there remains a rigid system of rationing of essential food-stuffs and consumer goods.

Back-breaking work and chronic poverty are the lot of the urban population as well. Chinese workers do not have paid holidays. They have also been denied bonuses and overtime pay, which amounted to 10-15 per cent of earnings in the first years of the People’s Republic of China. Real wages of workers

1. Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. III, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1967, p. 120.

have not been increased for several decades, which has led to disturbances in factories. During the campaign of “study of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat”, these actions were also condemned as “reactionary” and “at variance with Mao Tse-tung’s thoughts”. Although Chinese propaganda has today begun to write about the need to “improve the life of the people”, and announced a certain increase in wages in an attempt to open a safety valve for the discontent that has accumulated, it goes on to explain that “concern for the life of the masses has nothing in common with material incentive, and implies emphasis on politics as the guiding force.”<sup>1</sup>

Some of the external manifestations of Maoist “democracy” may seem very “revolutionary” to a superficial observer. For example, Chinese citizens have the right to write critical wall posters, a right guaranteed by the Maoist Constitution. Theoretically, every citizen can write and post in a public place these “big-character posters” and criticize any “person who is in power”. In actual fact, however, only posters approved from above appear on the walls. Anyone daring to criticize what the leadership has approved risks his freedom, or even his life. Needless to say, very few people venture to exercise this “right to express oneself freely.”

Should the “men in power” wish, everyone in China today can become a “dead tiger”, “a dog which fell into the water and which must be killed when it is drowning”. The role of the masses is reduced to their “approving” another of the leadership’s great instructions.

Let us consider another right, also enshrined in the Maoist Constitution—the right to strike. Deleted from the old Constitution were articles referring to the gradual growth of employment and the improvement of working conditions; instead, the “right to strike” is proclaimed.

Workers do strike in China, not against socialism—but against the present regime. The regime cracks down on striking workers. In 1975, strikes were suppressed in a metallurgical complex in Inner Mongolia, in the Kiangsi province, on the

1. *Jenmin jihpao*, November 11, 1977.



island of Hainan, in Hangchow and on many Chinese railway lines. Punitive army units were sent to quell the disturbances. Many strikers were arrested and imprisoned.

Mao Tse-tung needed the "right to strike" to discover malcontents and then deal with them ruthlessly. And this is the Maoist "line of the masses", or more precisely, the line of suppressing the masses.

This play with the "right to strike" does not make Mao a supporter of democracy. Mao was a fierce enemy of any democracy. "Some people say that elections are a very good and very democratic thing. In my view, elections are mere courtesy," Mao Tse-tung said at a meeting with an Albanian military delegation in May 1967.

For many years there have been no elections to party and government bodies. Neither the members of the Communist Party of China nor the people elected the delegates to the 9th, 10th and 11th Congresses of the Party and the participants in the session of the National People's Congress, held in January 1975. All of them were nominated on the basis of "consultations" among the Maoist to spet. The principle of "consultations" is also endorsed in the new Rules of the Maoist party adopted at the 11th Party Congress in August 1977. They have already forgotten in China that the population must participate in the formation of local bodies of power. There have been, for example, no elections to local "revolutionary committees".

In October 1977, a forthcoming session of the National People's Congress was announced in China, and the need to reorganize the "revolutionary committees" which had allegedly been penetrated by "bad people" was declared. However, press materials show that the "reorganization of the revolutionary committees"—this favourite brain-child of Mao Tse-tung—will be carried out by the same methods of "consultations".

When necessary, the masses poisoned by the venom of Maoism take part in organizing political and punitive sanctions against wavering or dissenting groups of people or individuals. This was the case during the "cultural revolution", when the hungweipings smashed party organizations, ridiculed communists, and set up their own prisons and torture chambers.

The former Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army of China, Lo Jui-ching, could not endure torture and maltreatment and tried to commit suicide twice by jumping out of a window. A former secretary of the Central Committee of the Young Communist League of China, Hu Yao-pang, was forced to crawl "like a dog and wear through two pairs of trousers a day". Political Bureau member Chen Yun "at times lost consciousness" when he was "tried" by the hungweipings. Teng To, a well-known Chinese writer, "was forced to eat dog food and drink from a spittoon". Wang Li, a party official known throughout the country, "was led around town on a rope" and "forced to live in a kennel". These and many other similar cases were reported in hungweiping newspapers, and they involved prominent leaders of the party and state. The fate of many rank-and-file communists was much harsher: without any pretence at investigation or trial they became victims of mob law. Mob rule was also practised later, when young people accused of "countering Mao's line" were "tried" at stadiums and summarily shot by decision of the "revolutionary masses" (mobs specially gathered for the purpose).

The same state of affairs prevails after Mao's death. Having turned the Maoist concepts and slogans against their political opponents (supporters of the so-called "gang of four"), Hua Kuo-feng and his new administration launched another total purge of the party, the army, organs of propaganda, mass organizations and transport agencies. As reported by Western correspondents in Peking, the former chairman of the State Committee for Physical Culture and Sports, Chuang Chieh-tung, a one-time table tennis world champion, tried to commit suicide. Accused of being associated with the "gang of four", he was removed from all his posts; his "case" was "investigated", during which, amidst gibes from a specially organized mob, he swept the alleys of the Kukung park in Peking. Having experienced Maoist "democracy", he knew what awaited him and preferred not to undergo the ordeals of the "line of the masses"...

As a result of purges carried out since the beginning of 1977, the leaders of party and revolutionary committees in 13 of



China's 29 provinces have been removed, and many ministers, managers of enterprises and secretaries of local party organizations have "disappeared". The purging, as in previous cases, was not confined to the removal of undesirable persons from their posts; political opponents of the new regime in China are executed.

"We must have a proper purge and check-up...In this we shall allow no indulgence and no half-way measures..."<sup>1</sup>—this is how *Jenmin jihpao* speaks of the coming purge in an article devoted to the anniversary of Hua Kuo-feng's coming to power.

The "line of the masses", which Maosit propaganda likes to harp on, is nothing but a skilful show designed to deceive the broadest masses of workers, peasants, working intelligentsia and youth, masses deprived of the fundamental civil and political rights, normal living conditions and simple human joys. This is one of the many examples of how false pseudo-revolutionary slogans serve as a cloak for the anti-people's policy pursued by Mao's followers.

## II. FOREIGN POLICY

"SOCIAL-IMPERIALISM"

THE "THREE WORLDS" CONCEPT

"SUPERPOWERS"

"TO SIT ON A MOUNTAIN AND WATCH TIGERS FIGHTING"

"THE WIND FROM THE EAST PREVAILS OVER THE WIND FROM THE WEST"

"WORLD UNDER THE HEAVENS"

"THREAT FROM THE NORTH"

"PEOPLE'S WAR"

1. *Jenmin jihpao*, November 8, 1977.



## "Social-imperialism"

"We must unfailingly comply with the behests of Mao Tse-tung and carry through the struggle against Soviet social-imperialism."

Hua Kuo-feng. Speech at the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China

Lenin gave a profound and comprehensive definition of the essence of imperialism when he described it as "capitalism at that stage of development at which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital is established; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun, in which the division of all territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed."<sup>1</sup>

Basing itself on Lenin's conception of imperialism, the international communist movement determined the contradiction between socialism and capitalism to be the fundamental contradiction of our time, and named three primary anti-imperialist forces of today: the community of socialist countries, the working-class and communist movement, and the national liberation movement.

In view of the new international situation, which is characterized by a fundamental change in the alignment of forces in favour of socialism on the world scene, the international communist movement has concluded that it is possible to avert world war, and that it is imperative to unite all anti-imperialist forces in the struggle for peace, democracy and socialism.

Mao Tse-tung took a different approach to the problem. In his view, imperialism is a "paper tiger" whose aggressiveness is only a semblance of might concealing decay inside.

Disregarding the danger of war with which the imperialist arms race is fraught, Mao entered on his list of "paper tigers" the atom bomb and the whole arsenal of imperialism's instruments of aggression. Indulging in revolutionary rhetoric

1. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, pp. 266-267.

instead of a serious analysis of imperialism, the Maoists regard imperialism not as a social system, but as a certain type of foreign policy against which "all the peoples of the world" should rise. Initially the Chinese leaders considered imperialism as confined to the "aggressive circles of the United States".

The Maoists originally asserted that the basic contradiction of our epoch was between the United States and "the peoples of the whole world", and that it could be resolved only by a world war in which the "paper tiger" would be bound to burn...

Proceeding from this conception of the nature of imperialism as a non-class phenomenon and from their attitude towards the Soviet Union as the main obstacle in their way to world hegemony, the Maoists subsequently put the USSR on a level with US imperialism and labelled it a "social-imperialist" state. This, in brief, is the political basis of Maoist speculations over the term "social-imperialism".

The term "social-imperialism" is not new in Marxist literature. Lenin used it in his works to expose the leaders of the Second International, who betrayed the interests of the working class, who betrayed the revolution, abandoned the principles of proletarian internationalism, and became lackeys of imperialism. In his works, Lenin spoke with indignation about "an upper section of petty-bourgeois scoundrels who have been bribed by the capitalists, such as are the social-imperialists of all countries,"<sup>1</sup> about the "social-imperialists... who have sold themselves to the bourgeoisie."<sup>2</sup> By "social-imperialists" Lenin meant "*agents of international imperialism operating within the labour movement.*"<sup>3</sup>

Maoist propaganda unscrupulously exploits the authority of Lenin, leader of the world revolution, and his unyielding stand against every form of opportunism, and puts a false interpretation on his words.

The first reference to "social-imperialism" in characterizing the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and

1. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 236.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 279.

3. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 502.



the Soviet state was made in *Jenmin jihpao* in August 1968. The editors of this newspaper published a special note explaining the term "social-imperialism". In this explanation, full of anti-Soviet fabrications, the leadership of the CPSU and the Soviet state was slanderously accused of "all-round restoration of capitalism in the country", of "global conspiracy with American imperialism", aimed at redividing the world. The Peking propagandists needed this blatantly false accusation against the socialist state to conceal and justify their own crimes against the Chinese people and all progressive mankind.

Maoist propaganda tirelessly exploits the term "social-imperialism" without hiding its aim—to discredit the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government. What is more, the Maoists hastened to write their anti-Soviet course into the country's new Constitution and in their party's new Rules adopted at the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China, where the task was set of "combating social-imperialism" and "the danger of the restoration of capitalism".

What is described in China today as "restoration of capitalism" is in fact the line which was always set in opposition to Maoist policy by the more far-sighted communist internationalists in the Communist Party of China, a line based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and aimed at raising the living standard of the people, a line whose victory in the Soviet Union is now historical reality.

The political practices of the Maoists on the international scene exactly fit the Leninist definition of social-imperialism. The Chinese leaders have established close contacts with Pinochet's fascist *junta* and with the racists in South Africa, and openly call for strengthening NATO.

West German visitors to China are strongly urged to fight for the "reunification of Germany"; American guests are advised not to pull their troops out of South Korea and Thailand, Japanese envoys are reminded of the need to demand of the Soviet Union the return of "ancient territories", etc.

China's present-day leaders pursue a policy which, as Leonid Brezhnev said in his report at the 25th Congress of the CPSU, "merges directly with the position of the world's most

extreme reaction—from the militarists and enemies of *detente* in the Western countries to the racists of South Africa and the fascist rulers of Chile. This policy is not only entirely alien to socialist principles and ideals, but has also, in effect, become an important aid to imperialism in its struggle against socialism."

### The "Three World" Concept

"The present situation is as follows: one world, two classes, the whole earth is divided into three parts."

Mao Tse-tung. "Points of Strategy", 1975

Historical developments in the last few decades show irrefutably that the overall development of world affairs, the successes and setbacks of the national liberation movements, and of the world working-class and democratic movements are determined by the struggle between the two world systems—socialism and capitalism.

In an attempt to mask their deviation from the principles of Marxism, their split with the community of socialist countries and at the same time to secure the support of the world national liberation movement, the Maoist leaders came up with the "three worlds" concept.

This reactionary theory according to which historical development is allegedly determined by a conflict between all the small and medium-sized states of the world and the two superpowers, the USSR and the United States, is not new. The Maoists have borrowed it from bourgeois ideologists, supplementing it with the thesis of two "inter-zones".

In the original version of this concept, the whole world was divided into three parts or zones: (1) the Western capitalist world headed by the United States, (2) the socialist camp, (3) the independent national states of Asia, Africa and Latin America, as well as the countries in these areas fighting for their independence, referred to as the Third World.

In 1964, to justify his final break with socialism, and to prepare the ground for a new and still current concept of world division, Mao Tse-tung put forward his idea of two "inter-



zones". He said: "The whole of Asia, Africa, Latin America and Canada are fighting against imperialism... At present, two inter-zones exist. The first includes Asia, Africa and Latin America. The second is Europe, North America and Oceania."

It is characteristic that in their new concept of world division the Chinese leaders made no mention of the socialist countries. In this way, they were already laying the ground for subsequent allegations (such as Chou En-lai's statement in September 1968), that "the so-called world socialist system no longer exist."<sup>1</sup>

At the UN General Assembly session in 1974, Teng Hsiao-ping presented a new variant of the still current "three worlds" concept: "The United States and the USSR are the first world; the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and other areas are the Third World, and the advanced countries between the two—the Second World."<sup>2</sup>

As for the place of the People's Republic of China in the current "concept" of world division, the Chinese leaders began in the late 1950s to press the idea that the PRC belongs to the category of Third World countries. Mao Tse-tung claimed in 1957, for example, that "from the political point of view and in terms of population China is a great power, but she is at the same time a small country from the economic viewpoint."<sup>3</sup>

In keeping with the "three worlds" concept, the Maoists want [to present China—one of the largest countries of the world, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a country with the largest regular army, which is intensively building up its missile and nuclear potential—as a special power and leader of the Third World countries.

*Jenmin jihpao* wrote on January 7, 1975 that "the Third World will sooner or later prevail over the superpowers, become the master in international affairs, and will take the place

1. *Jenmin jihpao*, September 3, 1968.

2. *ibid.*, April 14, 1974.

3. Speech delivered at Moscow State University at a meeting of Chinese students enrolled at Soviet educational institutions, November 17, 1957. *Mao Tse-tung*, Issue 2, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1970, p. 83.

of the superpowers". The Chinese leaders claim that this can happen only if the Third World follows China, which has "every right" to lead the Third World.

Peking's attempts to include China among the Third World countries are above all meant to bring these countries under China's influence. The Chinese leadership demonstratively opposes itself to the socialist world seeking to justify the low living standards of the Chinese people. The Chinese leadership spoke about China's membership in the socialist community as long as it derived benefits from this, and hastened to dissociate itself from world socialism when the hegemonic aims of the Maoists clashed with the peace-loving policy of the socialist community.

Peking tries to present its own interests as the common interests of the Third World countries. However, on the main international issues, particularly the questions of peace, security and disarmament, China and the Third World hold different views. The developing countries do not understand Peking's actions against *detente*, and firmly declare that they are interested in the relaxation of international tension.

By their actions the Peking leaders prove their absolute indifference to the fate and needs of the peoples in the developing countries. Peking stresses the expanding of relations with various states, including the most reactionary regimes, along the government lines and is losing interest in the national liberation movement to which it gives virtually no help, and which it tries to use only in its struggle against the Soviet Union.

Peking's widely advertised economic aid to the Third World countries is designed to achieve sensational propaganda effect. Of the total sum which the Maoists pledged to grant African countries from 1956 on, only 32 per cent has so far been given. Moreover, Chinese "aid" is rendered in sectors related to the light industry and agriculture. This is only natural. According to the designs of the Maoists, economically weak Africa will comply more obediently with Chinese policy.

The interests of the Third World countries are being severely harmed by Peking's attempts to drive a wedge between these countries and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, to break up the anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist front.



The experience of recent years has confirmed that those contingents of the national liberation movement which came under Peking's ideological influence, as a rule, suffered defeat. Revolutionaries and patriots who had been misled were killed, while the positions of the local reactionary forces became stronger and imperialism's influence in the countries concerned grew. No wonder reactionary and colonialist regimes centre their hopes on the Chinese leadership's divisive activities in the national liberation movements.

The new leaders of the People's Republic of China are trying to fit today's world developments into the Maoist "three worlds" scheme. "Chairman Mao's thesis differentiating the three worlds gives a correct orientation to the present international struggle...", Hua Kuo-feng stated at the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China. "Practice in the last few years has proved that this thesis of Chairman Mao's is entirely correct. With the passage of time, it will demonstrate its effectiveness even more powerfully."

The importunate propaganda of the Maoist "three worlds" theory has its reasons. The ultra-revolutionary and anti-imperialist phrase-mongering of the Peking leaders against a background of undisguised cooperation with the imperialist and reactionary forces is so cynical and unprincipled that it has disconcerted even those who have equipped themselves with Mao's dogmas.

Among others, Albania, whose leadership fully shared Mao Tse-tung's views during the last two decades, is now dissatisfied. In a leading article in the newspaper *Zeri i Popullit* of July 7, 1977, Albania criticized China for its Maoist "three worlds" concept. It finds unacceptable China's cooperation with the Chilean fascist junta, the Mobutu regime in Zaire, the Arab oil sheikhs, i.e., with all the reactionary forces which the Maoist theory of the "three worlds" regards as "revolutionary". Albania believes that the European, Canadian and Japanese proletariat should not negotiate class peace with the bourgeoisie, it rejects the Maoist thesis that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend", i.e., Albania does not wish to support all economic and military blocs for the sole reason that they are spearheaded against the Soviet Union. The Albanians have stated that

the "three worlds" theory is a "non-class, opportunist assessment of today's world, heedless of the fundamental contradictions of our epoch".

Without going into the reasons that prompted to Albanian Maoists to make such a sharp criticism of Mao Tse-tung's dogmas, it can be affirmed that the realization of the harmful character of Maoism by its adherents is historically inevitable.

### "Superpowers"

"...There are two great powers in the world today. Sometimes I figuratively call our world a pie in which we, like stuffing, are squeezed between two powerful forces."

Mao Tse-tung. Talk with Georges Pompidou, September 1973

In statements made by the leaders of the People's Republic of China, in articles appearing in the Chinese press and in radio programmes, the term "superpowers", by which the Maoists mean the USSR and the United States, is repeated more and more often. In Maoist theory of division of the world, the "superpowers" are the "first world" which is fought by the "third world" (the developing countries) as well as by the "second world" advanced countries with the exception of the United States and the USSR).

It is characteristic that this concept virtually equates two states with different social and economic systems—the United States and the USSR—in an apparent attempt to link these countries according to the aim which the United States and the USSR allegedly have in common. This aim, Chou En-lai said in his report at the 10th Congress of the Communist Party of China, is to "achieve world hegemony". "It is this aim for which the two superpowers are fighting and at the same time entering into conspiracy."

In June 1972, Leonid Brezhnev exposed this interpretation of the issue when he said: "There has been much talk lately about the role of individual countries in world affairs. Even the term 'superpowers' has been coined. We are against slurring over class differences between states. The Soviet Union is truly a great and mighty state; but, above all, it is a



socialist state pursuing a class socialist foreign policy. The same kind of policy, and not the line of 'big' or 'small' states, is followed by other fraternal socialist nations closely co-operating in the international arena in the fight to strengthen the forces of socialism and to ensure all peoples equal rights to freedom, independence and peaceful labour."

However, the Peking leaders have their own views on the matter. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China adopted in January 1975 urges the Chinese people to fight "the hegemony of the superpowers"; the struggle against the "superpowers" is thus raised to the level of a state policy.

Under the pretext of struggle against the "superpowers", which allegedly "strive to dominate the world... and contend with each other everywhere", the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China called for the creation of a "united front" that would be directed primarily against the Soviet Union.

Chinese propaganda also incessantly claims that "China will never be a superpower". This is also stated in the new Chinese Constitution. Addressing the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China, Hua Kuo-feng emphasized this pledge: "We will never seek hegemony or strive to be a superpower." But in practice the Chinese leaders are trying to group around China various forces and to use them in the struggle for the realization of their greatpower designs. China even today claims the role of a special "superpower" which is allegedly bound to protect small and medium-size countries against the "arbitrariness of the superpowers". For Peking, the "superpowers" theory is only a means to justify its struggle against the forces of socialism and progress, and to win over the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America for the pursuance of its anti-Soviet and anti-socialist line.

The Chinese leadership declared the "struggle against the two superpowers" to be the main problem of the present time and would like to subordinate to this task the policy of the overwhelming majority of countries, relegating to the background the solution of the urgent problems of disarmament and safeguarding the peace and security of nations. The Maoists would like to redirect the anti-imperialist fervour of the developing countries against the Soviet Union and distract them

from the struggle against imperialism, apartheid and racism, from the struggle for the total elimination of all vestiges of colonialism. The Maoists thus seek to spare the imperialist superpower, the United States, the full force of the blow.

### "To Sit on a Mountain and Watch Tigers Fighting"

"Provoke a fight between two tigers; wait until one of them is killed and the other wounded, and then truss up the wounded one..."<sup>1</sup>

The Maoists have embarked on the road of advocating international tension and military clashes and are forcing the world public to accept the idea that a new world war is inevitable.

"Every generation must have its war," and "there will be no lasting peace", Maoist propaganda asserts.

These militarist ideas were given legislative expression in the Chinese Constitution as well as in the resolutions of the 9th, 10th and especially the 11th Congresses of the Maoist party. Mao Tse-tung's foreign-policy concepts, reflected in these documents, are primarily designed to justify the need to maintain "chaos" in the world and the situation of "colossal upheavals", in the course of which China is to become, according to the Maoist plans, the leading force on the international scene.

The Maoist leaders see their role in this "chaos" in provoking armed conflicts between the Soviet Union and the United States; China must remain on the sidelines, and watch from a mountain the "two tigers fighting".

During the war against Japan Mao Tse-tung bided his time in the Yen-an caves, "watching from a mountain" while millions of his countrymen were dying in the struggle against the Japanese enslavers. In the difficult period of World War II he did not believe in the victory of the Soviet people over Nazi Germany, and passively awaited the outcome of the "fight of the tigers", thinking only of saving strength for future political intrigues.

1. Chungkhung Yanchiu (Taiwan), No. 106, 1975, p. 109.



No wonder that in the "special" foreign-policy programme which the Maoists openly advanced in the early 1960s, the idea of the "fight of two tigers" was given a prominent place. Hidden behind the pseudo-Leftist theses of this "special" Maoist line, such as the dictum that the "struggle for peace impedes the revolution", are attempts to provoke armed conflicts and establish "Greater China" on the ruins of battle.

It was in this period that Maoist China rejected joint actions with all progressive forces and began to take concrete steps to attain its great-power aims.

Already in the summer of 1958 the Chinese army created a dangerous situation in the Taiwan Strait when it began artillery fire on the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu occupied by the forces of Chiang Kai-shek, shielded by a treaty of alliance with the United States. This took place without any consultations with the Soviet Union, and in gross contravention of the Soviet-Chinese treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance.

A year later Mao Tse-tung took a similar "initiative" when he provoked an armed conflict on the border with India. This was not only at variance with the common line of the world communist movement, aimed at strengthening the newly independent states, but it also harmed the principles of peaceful coexistence and turned the world back to the gloomy period of the "cold war".

In 1962, in the days of the Caribbean crisis, when the firmness of the socialist community was tested, the efforts of the Chinese leaders were not aimed at helping revolutionary Cuba, but at stabbing it in the back, at turning the crisis into a military confrontation between the USSR and the United States.

The Maoists support every worsening of the situation in the Middle East and call on the Arab nations to mount "resolute actions". But they are in no hurry to assume any obligations to the Arab states.

Shortly before his death Mao thus commented on the Middle East events:

"Let them (the Arabs—*Ed.*) buy Soviet planes to shoot down American ones; let American missiles be bought to cripple Soviet tanks...In the final analysis, at issue is not who will

conquer whom, not that all Jews will be eliminated or that the Palestinian people will disappear from the face of the earth. The point is that the revolutionary storms will smash the aggressive forces of American imperialism and the Soviet revisionists..."

This line of argument betrays Mao's cynicism and the inhumanity of his "concept".

In full conformity with the policy of "sitting on a mountain and watching two tigers fighting", the Maoists generally seek to avoid any obligations which would entail any international responsibility on their part in the event of a war which they so actively advocate.

According to the Maoist concept of the world alignment of forces, all countries must make concerted efforts in the struggle against the two "superpowers", the main direction of the attack, the "enemy No. 1", being the Soviet Union.

Whenever there is talk about American imperialism, the Maoist leaders exhibit maximum delicacy; in extreme cases they resort to the tactics of "serious warnings", or they may completely close their eyes to imperialist policy.

This tactic was clearly evident in the Maoists' attitude to the fight of the Vietnamese people against American aggression. Amid curses hurled against "American imperialists" and against the background of protest demonstrations in Peking attended by millions of people, Mao Tse-tung assured the Americans that "the Chinese are too pre-occupied with their internal affairs, and will fight only if the United States attacks China". No wonder that several weeks after Mao Tse-tung made these assurances the United States began its massive bombing raids on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Peking approved of the building of a US military base on Diego Garcia Island, supports the US presence in South Korea, Thailand and other parts of Asia, and is surprisingly mild on the Taiwan question.

The Chinese Foreign Minister, speaking at a meeting in Tientsin in the summer of 1975, gave a very interesting explanation of a similar situation, linking it with the same Maoist idea of "two tigers". He said: "If we made no difference between the Soviet Union and America, if we exerted too much



pressure on both hegemons, they could join forces and we would have our hands tied; it is necessary therefore to differentiate between the main and the secondary..."

There is nothing original about such methods of "pressure". When the Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, visited the People's Republic of China in August 1977, the Deputy Premier of the State Council of the PRC, Teng Hsiao-ping, tried to convince him of the need for building up NATO military strength, for "serious" preparations for war against the USSR.

As the Kyodo Tsushin agency of Japan later reported, Teng Hsiao-ping, at a meeting with Japanese parliamentarians after Vance's visit, complained that the US Secretary of State had not heeded his entreaties, that the United States was "not bold enough" to provoke a war against the USSR...

The Maoist concept of balancing between "two tigers" was carried forward by Hua Kuo-feng at the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China, when he declared that "Soviet social-imperialism is on the offensive, while US imperialism is on the defensive", thus absolving US imperialism from its responsibility for increasing world tension. And in October 1977, Teng Hsiao-ping, in an interview with the director of France Presse agency, cast aside all "theoretical" camouflage and called on all countries, including the United States, to build a united front, the "broadest possible front" to fight the Soviet Union.

But today the Chinese leadership has much fewer opportunities than in the past to "sit on a mountain and watch tigers fighting". Despite the claims of Peking propaganda, the present generation of mankind does not want to "have its own war", and hardly anyone will want to play the role of tigers in the Chinese circus. The statesmen of other countries who come to Peking on official visits are compelled to dissociate themselves from Maoist doctrines with increasing frequency. The traditional methods of the Chinese emperors, taken over by the present Peking strategists, are clearly no longer concordant with the main trends of world development.

## "The Wind from the East Prevails over the Wind from the West"

"We have long had a firm opinion on the question of the international situation, and it has always been optimistic. We later expressed it in the form of the slogan 'The wind from the East prevails over the wind from the West'."

Mao Tse-tung. Speech at a session of the Supreme State Conference, September 5, 1958

In December 1949, at a conference of trade unions of Asia and Oceania held in Peking, Mao Tse-tung's supporters tried to substantiate their claims to a leading role in the revolutionary movement in Asia. They tried to force upon the communist parties of Indonesia and India programmes which disregarded the concrete situation in these countries, and asked them to emulate the experience of the liberation struggle in China. This was when the thesis appeared about the "wind from the East prevailing over the wind from the West".

At that time, however, Mao Tse-tung had to reckon with the fact that an overwhelming part of the party and the people saw the possibility of socialist restructuring of Chinese society only in alliance with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. This is why Mao Tse-tung was compelled, at a conference of representatives of communist and workers' parties, held in Moscow in 1957, to interpret his thesis as follows: "It is my opinion that the international situation has now reached a new turning point. There are two winds in the world today, the East Wind and the West Wind... That is to say, the forces of socialism have become overwhelmingly superior to the forces of imperialism."<sup>1</sup>

After 1958, the nationalist trends in the policy of the Chinese leaders began to manifest themselves ever more clearly. The leaders of the Communist Party of China began their persistent attempts to spread Mao Tse-tung's ideas in the world communist movement. The thesis that "the wind from the East

1. *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1972, pp. 80-81.



prevails over the wind from the West" was reinterpreted to read: "Asia, Africa and Latin America are the areas of future revolutionary storms; in these backward agricultural areas revolutions will develop according to the model of the Chinese revolution; the centre of the world revolution has shifted further to the East, to China."

At the Moscow Meeting of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties, held in November 1960, the delegates of the Communist Party of China had to listen to criticism of the delegates of many fraternal parties against the stand of the Chinese leadership on a number of questions of fundamental importance. Their concept that "the wind from the East prevails over the wind from the West" was subjected to comradely criticism. The representatives of the Communist Party of China in their statements agreed with this criticism. But on June 14, 1963, the leadership of the Communist Party of China issued a letter in which it offered the world communist movement its own, special "general line" of 25 points, including Mao's great-power speculations about "the wind from the East".

It was evident that the Chinese theoreticians wanted to replace the idea of the class unity of struggling nations by a call for separation of the nations of the East, under the leadership of China, on a nationalist and even racist basis.

The Chinese leaders reason that since China is the biggest country in the East and expresses its interests it is here that the "winds of history" originate which are to prevail over the "winds from the West". Thus the slogan is nothing but an ideological and political expression of the hegemonic ambitions of the Chinese leaders.

The cynicism of these ambitions is shown by numerous statements of the author of the "winds" concept, Mao Tse-tung, such as his statement at a session of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, held in August 1965: "As soon as we win South-East Asia, we shall be able to expand our forces in this area; we shall then have our forces to counter the Soviet-East European bloc...the wind from the East will then actually prevail over the wind from the West." During the "cultural revolution" the Maoists

repeatedly declared that "the wind from Peking" will blow "Mao's banners over the capitals of the world".

Peking's practices in the international scene, especially after Mao Tse-tung's death, make it increasingly clear that the Maoist leadership, which began with vague speculations about the magic power of the "wind from the East", has now finally abandoned the ideas of internationalism. This is proven by the fact that more attempts are being made in China to cast aspersions on the fraternal bonds of the countries of the socialist community, their struggle against the forces of imperialist reaction and aggression, for peace and friendship among nations. The anti-Sovietism of the Maoists is identical with anti-communism. The Chinese leadership's attitude is negative to the possibility of the communists in Western capitalist countries (France, Italy, Spain) coming to power. Fearing that the communist parties of these countries would be able to help strengthen the forces of world socialism when they join the government, Peking places them in the camp of its potential opponents.

...The most zealous fighters against the "West wind" have reached the height of betrayal by becoming its greatest supporters.

### "World Under the Heavens"

"We must conquer the globe. Our object is the whole globe. As to how to work on the Sun, we shall not yet talk. As to the Moon, Mercury, Venus—all the eight planets, besides the Earth, we shall be able to investigate them and visit them, if it is possible to visit them at all. As far as work and fighting are concerned, our globe, where we shall create a mighty power, is, in my opinion, more important than anything else. We must be imbued by this determination."

Mao Tse-tung. Speech at an enlarged session of the Military Council of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, September 11, 1959.



In articles which appear in the Chinese press, and in the speeches of Chinese leaders, not only the world as a whole, but the People's Republic of China is increasingly referred to by the old term, "World Under the Heavens". This is not a literary metaphor, nor is it a tribute to China's historical past. The Maoists endow the term "World Under the Heavens" with concrete political meaning.

The roots of China's great-power foreign policy are in the distant past, when the relations between that state and other countries were built on the notion of China's central position as the "Heavenly Empire of the Middle" and on the superiority of the Chinese nation over all other nations. This notion stemmed from the fact that China did not have direct contacts with countries of a comparable level of civilization, the consequence was not only the conviction of China's own greatness, her superiority and perfection, but also the habit of regarding the peoples of neighbouring countries, influenced by Chinese civilization, as second-rate people, "candidates to being Chinese". The Chinese revolutionary democrat Sun Yat-sen said in this connection: "China highly rated her own achievements and ignored other states. This grew into a habit, and was considered as something entirely natural."<sup>1</sup>

Mao Tse-tung adopted the arguments of the rulers of ancient and medieval China and the Kuomintang. When he listed in 1939 the "territories which China lost", he said: "Japan seized Korea, Taiwan, Ryukyu, the Pescadores, and Port Arthur. Britain seized Burma, Bhutan, Nepal and Hong Kong. France took Vietnam and Kwangchow, and even such a small state as Portugal seized our Macao."<sup>2</sup>

In the first years of the People's Republic of China, Peking pursued a veiled policy aimed against the interests of neighbouring countries. The Chinese leaders were afraid of prematurely revealing their expansionist plans, so as not to discredit themselves in the eyes of those who sympathized with the Chinese revolution and were giving it material, moral and

political support.

In April 1955, a conference of heads of state and government of 29 Asian and African countries was held in Bandung. Despite the heterogeneous composition of the participants and of their different political orientation, the conference unanimously adopted as the main document the Declaration in Support of Universal Peace and Cooperation. At that time, China widely proclaimed its peacefulness, and together with India was the initiator of the five principles of peaceful coexistence approved at the Bandung conference. At the conference, Chou En-lai assured the countries bordering on China that China had no territorial claims against them. He declared that this stance "will not be changed under any circumstances". But the Maoist leaders were already attempting to use their participation in the conference to attain nationalist aims in the Asian and African world—isolation of the countries of Asia and Africa from the Soviet Union, from world socialism and from the international proletariat. It is typical that the Peking leaders never implemented the Bandung principles. One of the main principles adopted at the Bandung Conference, that of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries, was violated by China in 1955-1956, when Chinese troops made armed incursions into Burma, and in 1959-1962 into India.

The result of the great-Han policy of the Maoist leadership were territorial claims against the neighbouring countries. One of the first demands was to "restore" China's sovereign power over the Mongolian People's Republic. Peking officially launched this demand in October 1954.

The Maoist leadership also waged "cartographic aggression" against neighbouring countries. In 1954, *A Brief History of Modern China* was published in Peking; the book was supplemented with a map showing "Chinese territories seized by the imperialists in the period from 1840 to 1919". The map showed China as including Burma, Vietnam, Korea, Thailand, Malaya, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, the Andaman Islands and the Sulu Archipelago. After the publication of these maps Peking declared the borders of the People's Republic of China with neighbouring countries "unjust". The Maoists camouflaged

1. Sun Yat-sen, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1964, p. 250 (in Russian).

2. Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. 2. Issued by the Bureau of the Central Committee, Communist Party of China, in the liberated district of Shanghsi-Hepei-Shantung-Henan, 1948.



this campaign by statements about the "imperialist" heritage in Asia, and allegations that the question of borders was resolved in a historical period when the Chinese people and the nations of the neighbouring countries were deprived of their rights. To "restore justice" the Maoists made the following territorial claims: in 1954 to 1.5 million sq. km. of Mongolian territory, in 1956 to 70,000 sq. km. of Burmese territory, in 1959 to 130,000 sq. km. of Indian territory and in 1964 to 1.5 million sq. km. of Soviet territory. The total area claimed by the Maoists is equal to one-third of China's territory.

The Maoist leaders increasingly resorted to armed conflicts and border provocations. Since the birth of the People's Republic of China, the number of border disputes and clashes resulting in armed conflicts has exceeded the total number of similar incidents in the rest of the world.

China's neighbours on the continent are all socialist and developing states, and Peking describes the borders with them as "historically unjust, undemarcated and unsettled". Peking's border policy is not only a means of exerting pressure on its neighbours, but also a preparation for direct territorial aggression aimed at seizing the economic potential and resources of neighbouring countries. Particular importance is attached to strategic areas.

At a session of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee in August 1965, Mao Tse-tung said bluntly: "We must by all means get hold of South-East Asia, including South Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia and Singapore. In regard to Cambodia we must adhere to the principle of peaceful coexistence...The area of South-East Asia is very rich; it abounds in minerals and is worth taking. In the future it will be very useful for the development of Chinese industry. In this way it will be possible completely to compensate the losses." This was a territorial claim on countries whose total area is 1,696,000 square kilometres.

Since 1960 the Chinese leadership has been whipping up tension on the Soviet-Chinese border. Maps and teaching aids had appeared even earlier, showing part of Soviet territory as "ancient" Chinese lands. In March 1968, an editorial in *Jenmin jihpao* described the treaties demarcating Soviet-Chinese borders

as inequitable. In the period of the "cultural revolution" the Chinese side started to organize mass provocations on the Soviet-Chinese border.

The Soviet government, hoping to normalize Soviet-Chinese relations, proposed discussing the questions of precise demarcation of certain sections of the Soviet-Chinese border back in 1964, but the Chinese side did not support these proposals. In March 1969 the Chinese side provoked an armed clash in the River Ussuri area, which resulted in the death of Soviet and Chinese border guards. From 1969 to the present, the Soviet government has been trying to normalize the situation on the Soviet-Chinese borders, and has been conducting negotiations on this issue in Peking. But the Chinese side did not accept any of the constructive proposals put forward at the negotiations by the Soviet delegation, and made a number of preliminary conditions with a view to deadlocking the negotiations. The Chinese leaders tried to put the blame for the deadlock on the Soviet Union, as Hua Kuo-feng did in his report to the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China; he asserted that the Soviet side "made it impossible to achieve anything in the negotiations".

While manoeuvring in the home-policy sphere, the present Peking leaders have retained intact the great-power foreign policy, the so-called "revolutionary external political line of Chairman Mao".

Chinese schoolchildren are taught today, just as they were many centuries ago, that China is a "World Under the Heavens", the centre of the world, that all foreigners are barbarians, and that all must recognize the superiority of the ideas of the leader of the "World Under the Heavens"—Mao Tse-tung.

### "Threat from the North"

"The Soviet revisionists never for a moment abandoned the idea of enslaving us."

Mao Tse-tung, "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", Peking, 1977

The thesis of a "threat" to China from the Soviet Union, and the declaration that the Soviet Union is "China's enemy No.1" was the logical culmination of a series of steps taken by the



Chinese leadership in betrayal of the interests of socialism, towards a split with the Soviet Union and the community of socialist countries.

In the first years of the existence of the People's Republic of China the Maoist group had to reckon with the sympathies of the Chinese working people for the USSR and the views held by communists-internationalists in the leadership of the Communist Party of China, who stood for friendship with the Soviet Union. But as the Chinese leaders gradually deviated from the principles of Marxism, as their hegemonic ambitions grew—masked by arguments of China's exclusiveness, and the special significance of Mao's ideas—the enmity of the leadership of the Communist Party of China to the Soviet Union became increasingly evident. In the early 1960s the Chinese press began to claim that imperialism is less dangerous than "modern revisionism"<sup>1</sup>—the Maoists' designation of the Land of Soviets.

In the first days of the "cultural revolution", Maoist propaganda openly proclaimed the slogan "the Soviet Union is our mortal enemy". In the documents of the 9th Congress of the Communist Party of China, held in April 1969, Mao Tse-tung's "latest statement" that "social-imperialism" is the main enemy was quoted. The "Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Nixon's Visit to Peking, July 20, 1971" said: "The Chinese-Soviet differences are antagonistic at the present stage, and are the main differences in our relations with the rest of the world."<sup>2</sup>

In June 1961, China refused further Soviet assistance in the construction of a large number of industrial projects. Since June 1962, violations of the Chinese-Soviet border by the Chinese side have been systematic. In January 1967, an unprecedented anti-Soviet provocation was staged by Chinese citizens on the Red Square in Moscow, and shortly afterwards the hungweipings organized rowdy disturbances outside the Soviet Embassy in Peking which lasted almost two months. The climax of the anti-Soviet campaign was an armed provocation on the Soviet border in the area of Damansky Island, on March 13, 1969.

1. *Jenmin jihpao*, February 19, 1968.

2. *Chanwang* (Hong Kong), 1972, No. 242.

In 1969, 1970, 1971 and 1973, the Soviet Union submitted proposals for normalizing relations with the Chinese government, but the Chinese leadership ignored the Soviet initiatives. On January 15, 1971, for example, China rejected the Soviet proposal to conclude a treaty renouncing the use of force under the pretext that the USSR and the people's Republic of China had signed in 1950 a treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance. When the Soviet Union asked China to confirm that the commitments under the treaty remained in effect for both sides, the Chinese side refused to do so. The Chinese leaders also failed to respond in any way to the Soviet proposal of 1972 that Chinese-Soviet relations be built on the principles of peaceful coexistence. Also rejected was the Soviet proposal of June 14, 1973 for negotiations on a mutual non-aggression treaty. The Maoist leadership intimidates the population of China with the alleged "threat from the North", and is doing everything to maintain tension in its relations with the Soviet Union.

After the 10th Congress of the Communist Party of China a new line appeared in Peking's propaganda. The Chinese leaders began to claim that the "Soviet threat" in the East is merely a screen for a campaign to bring Western Europe under Soviet control. In his report at the 10th Congress of the Communist Party of China, delivered on August 24, 1973, Chou En-lai said that "the Soviet revisionists are making a feint to the East while attacking in the West".

These excesses of Maoist propaganda reflect the attempts of the Chinese leaders to thwart the process of improving relations between the Soviet Union and the European socialist states and the West European countries, to provoke a military clash between the Soviet Union and the United States, and to undermine the relaxation of tension, especially after the successful completion of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation in 1975. Of considerable importance is the fact that the Chinese leaders' claim that China may be invaded at any time from the North can diminish the activity of the Western world in trading with China. Thus the alleged threat not to China but to the West is designed mainly for export.

As regards the domestic propaganda of the Maoists, they



need the mythical "threat from the North" to be able to divert the attention of the people from failures in their domestic and foreign policies. China increasingly resembles a military camp where life goes according to military laws, always on the alert for a sudden enemy attack.

After the death of Mao Tse-tung, one would have expected a revision of the Maoist dogmas that led to the aggravation of Chinese-Soviet relations, including the alleged "threat from the North". It was Mao himself who brought about a worsening of relations between the two countries. But, unfortunately, there has been no revision of this policy. The acts of goodwill conducted by the Soviet government after Mao's death met with no response from the Chinese side. The Chinese leadership rejected even such initiatives of the Soviet government as the proposal on cooperation among seismologists and on the establishment of contacts in the framework of friendship societies between the two countries. Teng Hsiao-ping, in a talk with a West German military delegation on September 27, 1977, said: "I shall not live to see a rapprochement with the USSR, nor will Hua Kuo-feng. Nor will such a rapprochement take place within the lifetime of the new generation in China..."

Peking's anti-Soviet campaign is hypocritically depicted as a "principled dispute" which will last a long time, as a "tit-for-tat struggle" against the "hegemonism of the Soviet Union, which is alleged not to have given up the 'idea of enslaving China' and still threatens it..."

This propaganda, designed to worsen Chinese-Soviet relations still further, may entail perilous complications that run counter to the interests of the Chinese people. It only plays into the hands of those who are for permanent enmity between the Chinese People's Republic and the socialist countries and an intensification of international tension.

## "People's War"

"I have generalized the experience of partisan warfare in 16 hieroglyphs as follows: 'The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy halts, we harass; the enemy retreats, we pursue'..."

Mao Tse-tung. "On the Natural Sciences", Talk with Chou Pei-yuan, August 24, 1964

The "people's war" theory was for many decades central in China's military development. Mao Tse-tung and his followers, forced to fight for the liberation of the country under conditions of the enemy's crushing superiority in weapons and material, emphasized the methods of partisan warfare in military theory, stressing the decisive role of man in war.

The Maoist view of the relationship between men and weaponry in modern war is evident in such formulations as "victories and defeats are decided by people and not by weapons, whatever they are".

Although these formulations are essentially correct, they assume an entirely different meaning in the Maoist version. They create the false impression that all theoreticians, with the exception of the Maoists, regard weapons to be the decisive factor in a war. These theoretical "discoveries" deliberately separate military technology from men, presenting it as a self-sufficient force.

The views of the "people's war" theoreticians on the character of a war involving China proceed from the assumption that the economic, scientific and technical superiority of the enemy is pitted against the numerical, moral and political superiority of the Chinese. Lin Piao wrote in his booklet *Long Live the Victory of the People's War* that the "ocean of the Chinese people who took up arms, and number hundreds of millions will engulf your aggressive forces".

It is also evident that the Maoists believe in the "people's war" theory as a purely military concept only so long as they do not possess sufficient modern means of warfare. Mao's statement that "the atom bomb is a paper tiger" is not substantiated by the frantic build-up of the missile and nuclear



potential of China. This activity has recently reached a colossal scale. In the period following the death of Mao Tse-tung, China has carried out four nuclear explosions (there were 22 tests in all). Against the background of these explosions Peking held national conferences on military questions, attended by army representatives and executives of the armament industry. The father of the Chinese nuclear bomb, Chien Hsiu-sen, who returned from the United States in the 1950s, said in a public statement that in China "the rate of carrying out nuclear armament programmes is far higher than in the United States and the Soviet Union when they were at the same stage".

In 1976, China's direct military spending amounted to more than 40 per cent of the expenditures of the state budget, and nearly half of the sum went into missiles and nuclear weapons.

Today the basic thesis of the "people's war" theory, that "all peoples are soldiers", is used by the Maoists primarily to whip up war hysteria, chauvinism and anti-Sovietism.

"The sky glows with gunfire.

The earth is pock-marked with shell-holes."

This is the kind of world Mao the poet would like to see.

"In a font of the hatred of the masses

we shall dip our bayonets ..

Power is born of bayonets and butts,

Butts and bayonets bring us closer

To victory over the enemy.

All over the country :

On the mountain slopes

and in patrol boats at sea.

Bayonets glare

And we hear the call "Kill!"

Chinese newspapers<sup>1</sup> carried this "Ode to the Bayonet" on their front pages as important political material...

"The people's wisdom knows no bounds,

We shall give China the neutron bomb..."

This is the promise of Chang Ai-ping, a "poet" from the military department who for a long time held the rank of Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation

1. *Jenmin jihpao*, September 21, 1977.

Army of China. So much for "poetry" Here is some "prose."

"War is inevitable...and there cannot be any lasting peace." This is what Hua Kuo-feng said at the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China. And Defence Minister Yeh Chien-ying echoed him : "A large-scale war will break out soon."

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the People's Liberation Army in August 1977, the Chinese leaders once again focused emphasis on the Maoist concept of "people's war". "Each of the 800 million people," the army newspaper *Chiehfangchunpao* declared, "must be able to fire a rifle and fight."<sup>1</sup>

Blinded by their militarist fervour, the Peking war-mongers intend to arm and throw into battle all their countrymen, including infants.

But there are also non-military aspects of this problem.

Mao Tse-tung and his followers proclaimed "people's war" a universal truth that makes it possible to incite the "world village" to rise against the "world town", and to "destroy imperialism on a global scale". It is along this line that Lin Piao explained this concept of Mao's in his *Long Live the Victory of the People's War*.

The Maoists want to force the slogan "The world can be transformed only with the help of the gun" upon all, especially on the national liberation movement. The "special" foreign-policy line of the Maoists means aggravating the international situation and provoking other countries to armed conflicts.

By tirelessly repeating the Maoist slogans that "war leads to revolution", that China, with the world's largest population, "will survive any disaster" to enjoy the fruits of that revolution, the Peking leaders are trying to instil their people with hatred for...*detente*, with the idea that *detente* is "reactionary". For the Maoists, as Teng Hsiao-ping pointed out, the Helsinki Conference was nothing but a "scrap of paper". They are especially eager to worsen Soviet-American relations, and to bring about a military and political confrontation between the USSR and the United States.

But the Chinese leadership does not want to wage the

1. *Chiehfangchunpao*, August 1, 1977.



"people's war" with its own forces. It would rather employ the tactics of "sitting on a mountain and watching" the war waged by the other "tigers". And in such a "comfortable" position, no war is too horrible, not even a nuclear war. No wonder that another theory originated in Peking—"the atom bomb is another paper tiger". Mao Tse-tung expounded this theory at the meeting of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow in 1957, when he said: "Let us try to estimate how many people will perish if a war breaks out. Possibly, human losses will be one-third, maybe even more, one half of mankind out of the 2,700 million people of the world. As soon as the war begins, atomic and hydrogen bombs will be dropped. I argued about this with a foreign politician. He believes that all people may perish in an atomic war. I said that one half of the people at the utmost, but that the other half will remain. But imperialism will be wiped from the surface of the earth, and the whole world will be socialist. After some time, the population will again rise to 2,700 million, and maybe to a higher figure."

This "poetic description" of the total destruction of mankind is the logical development of the Maoist theory of a "people's war".

"There is only one way to liquidate war—to wage a war against war..." Mao wrote in 1936. "War will be a bridge which mankind will cross into a new historical epoch in which there will be no wars..."<sup>1</sup>

This thesis of Mao's has been the main principle for determining the stand of the Maoists on questions of war and peace.

The main effort in the Maoists' struggle against the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence is directed at setting this principle against the world revolutionary process. The present leaders of the Communist Party of China interpret the very concept of peaceful coexistence in a distorted way, present the policy based on this concept in a false light, artificially isolate and separate peaceful coexistence as a specific form of class struggle from other aspects of the revolutionary struggle of nations and try to prove that the line of peaceful coexistence of states with

1. Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, pp. 312-313 (in Russian.)

differing social systems represents a retreat from revolution, a retreat from the class struggle of the working people in the capitalist countries, a retreat from the national liberation struggle and from the struggle against imperialism in general.

To set peaceful coexistence against the revolutionary struggle of nations, to try to interpret these two phenomena as mutually exclusive alternatives—either peaceful coexistence or revolutionary struggle, with no third road—to ignore the close and strong inner connection between peaceful coexistence and revolutionary struggle—these are the most characteristic features of the stand of the present Chinese leaders on this issue.



### III. POLITICAL PRACTICE

THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

CAMPAIGN OF "CRITICISM OF LIN BIAO AND  
CONFUCIUS"

STUDY OF THE "THEORY OF THE DICTATOR-  
SHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT"

CRITICISM OF THE NOVEL "WATER MARGIN"

CAMPAIGN OF CRITICISM OF THE "BLACK  
WIND OF RIGHT-WING DEVIATION"

### The "Cultural Revolution"

"The present great proletarian cultural revolution is absolutely necessary and most opportune for consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, preventing a restoration of capitalism, and building of socialism..."

Mao Tse-tung. Documents of the 9th Congress of the Communist Party of China

Long before the "cultural revolution" started, two lines, two approaches to the solution of China's problems, could be distinctly observed in the Communist Party of China. One line, pursued by the internationalist core of the Communist Party of China, was that of planned construction of the foundations of socialism taking into account the laws of socialist construction confirmed by the experience of other socialist countries. This line was reflected in the resolutions of the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China, in critical speeches of many communists at the Lushan plenary session of the Central Committee (1959) and in the realistic steps towards improving the country's economy taken between 1961 and 1965.

The second line, adhered to by Mao Tse-tung and his followers, was based on the idea of building "barracks communism" in China, on a split with the Soviet Union and the socialist community. The adventurism and great-power aims of this policy were clearly in evidence in the period of the "people's communes" and the "great leap".

The hidden power struggle in the party leadership came to a head in the autumn of 1965. The balance of forces at that time did not enable Mao Tse-tung to suppress his political opponents within the frame-work of an inner-party discussion. This spurred the Maoists' decision to launch an attack against the party and the bodies of people's government "from outside" and to use for this purpose the army and a section of the youth brainwashed in the Maoist spirit.

The military-political, anti-socialist coup planned by Mao Tse-tung and his companions, which they later called "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", was aimed at removing all



who were opposed to Mao Tse-tung's policy from leading posts in the party and the government, especially the followers of the resolutions of the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China, at enforcing "Mao Tse-tung's thoughts" and making the party, the army and all links of the state apparatus a tool for the regime of personal power in implementing the great-power hegemonic policy.

The first stage of the "cultural revolution" began in October 1965, when Mao Tse-tung, at a working meeting of the Standing Committee of the Central Committee's Political Bureau, called for a political campaign to be started against Wu Han, a prominent historian and author of the historical drama *Hai Jui Dismissed from Office*.<sup>1</sup>

Mao's attempt to settle accounts with the drama's author met with resistance. Mao's opponents were well aware that the seemingly unimportant issue of Wu Han's criticism had much wider implications.

At the beginning of November 1965 Mao Tse-tung left Peking for Shanghai, where he stayed until mid-July of the next year. Here, with his closest followers in the party and military leadership, he began preparations for an attack against party organs.

On November 10, an article appeared in the Shanghai newspaper *Wenhueipao* "On the New Historical Drama *Hai jui Dismissed from Office*". The article, dictated by Mao Tse-tung, ranked Wu Han among the "scum" which had allegedly attempted, in the early 60s, "to restore the criminal rule of landlords and kulaks". It was a signal for the Mao group to start a political struggle against the sound forces in the party.

1. The main hero of this drama is the official Hai Jui, who, in 1566, at the risk of his life submitted a report to Emperor Chia-ching of the Ming dynasty, which denounced him in coarse words and spoke about the impoverishment of the country and the hunger of the people. He told the emperor: "You have sunk into mysticism, you are dreaming about immortality and eternal youth, you regard only yourself right... the burden of your mistakes is too heavy to bear..."

Wu Han's commentary on this drama published in *Jenmin jihpao* ended with the words: "Hai Jui scolded the emperor, and there were people everywhere who sympathized with him and supported him."

This article in the central party paper sounded like an appeal to criticize Mao Tse-tung.

An Army Group for matters relating to the "cultural revolution" was set up at the Military Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. A conference of the Group was held in Shanghai from February 2 to 20, 1966, under the direction of Chiang Ching.<sup>1</sup> The proceedings of the conference bore evidence of the intention of the Mao group to use the army as the decisive force in the planned "cultural revolution". To strengthen Maoist control over the army, a purge in the military command was carried out in March 1966. The main victim was the Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Deputy Premier of the State Council, Lo Jui-chin.

It should be noted that the opposition was aware of the danger of Mao Tse-tung's actions. Attempts were made to restrict the beginning of "cultural revolution" to the lawful limits of an all-party discussion, to prevent chaos and anarchy. On behalf of the Party Central Committee and the Group for the Cultural Revolution which was set up at the Central Committee, Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Peng Chen and other leaders sent "working groups of the cultural revolution" to the provinces, where these groups were to control the "cultural revolution". For some time the communists in these groups successfully warded off the anti-party and anti-government actions of Mao's local followers. This was possible because these groups had the support of communists and the working people in the provinces. However, Mao Tse-tung immediately retaliated.

On May 16, 1966, a "notification" of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China dissolved the Group for the Cultural Revolution at the Central Committee, which was headed by Peng Chen, and set up a new group. The working groups were immediately recalled from the provinces. This was followed by a broad campaign against Peng Chen, member of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee,

1. Chiang Ching, Mao Tse-tung's fourth wife, formerly an unsuccessful Shanghai actress, had not figured on the political scene until 1966 because Chinese communists knew her dark past too well.



and against the Peking Party Committee<sup>1</sup> which he headed. On June 4, 1966, a resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was published on the reorganization of the Peking Party Committee and the appointment of its new secretaries. After that "shock detachments" began to be formed in Peking's educational establishments for an attack against the party. The period of preparation for the "cultural revolution" had ended.

When Mao Tse-tung and his followers had called new military units to Peking and mobilized detachments of Peking's hungweipings they decided to convene a plenary session of the Central Committee. They expected that with the support of these forces they would gain decisive superiority over their political opponents in the highest guiding bodies of the party and that they would sanction the "cultural revolution" on behalf of the Central Committee. The 11th plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee was held in Peking from August 1 to 12, 1966.

In the course of the meeting Mao Tse-tung issued his appeal "Bombard the headquarters!" It called for disbanding central and local party bodies which were labelled "bourgeois headquarters".

Amidst the terror which began in the country Mao Tse-tung and his followers launched an open attack against their opponents. Hungweiping detachments were brought to the hall where the plenary meeting was held. The outcome of the meeting were major organizational and personnel changes in the party leadership. Lin Piao became the only Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. However, the fact that men like Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping remained in the Political Bureau was an indication that the plenary meeting was only a transitional stage in the process

1. It was not accidental that Mao Tse-tung first attacked the Peking organizations. It was here that opposition to his group was strongest in central party bodies.

Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen had great authority in the Peking party organization. The central party organs in Peking, the newspaper *Jenmin jihpao*, the journal *Hungchi* and others, also took a definite stand against Mao's group, as can be seen from their protection of Wu Han and his drama.

of forming a Maoist leadership in the party.

The resolutions of the 11th plenary meeting essentially meant that on behalf of the Party Central Committee Mao Tse-tung and his followers legalized a broad-based attack against the party under the banner of the "cultural revolution". Soon after the plenary session, the Group for the Cultural Revolution at the Central Committee, controlled by Mao Tse-tung's private secretary Chen Po-ta and Chiang Ching, was given special powers. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China practically ceased to exist as the highest guiding body. It was replaced by the Group for the Cultural Revolution. The second stage of the "cultural revolution" began—that of mass onslaught against party and government bodies, of the closure of many newspapers and journals and the disbanding of public organizations.

Chaos reigned in the country. Educational establishments were closed. Eight gatherings were held in Peking, attended by a total of nearly 13 million hungweipings. Addressing these gatherings, Mao Tse-tung, Chiang Ching and other members of the Group for the Cultural Revolution called to "smash the propaganda department of the Central Committee" and the "old Ministry of Culture" and "depose" many leaders of the party and the government. Mass trials of important figures were held at stadiums in Peking and in other Chinese cities.

Two-thirds of the Central Committee elected by the 8th Congress were removed from practical activity and more than half of the members and alternate members of the Political Bureau were labelled Mao Tse-tung's enemies. Eight of China's nine marshals, nearly all ministers and heads of central departments of the State Council fell into disfavour. Provincial organizations were also subjected to systematic onslaught.

The country had a rough time during the "rebellion" organized by Mao and his group. Factories stopped working and supplies were erratic. Mass actions of workers against the "cultural revolution" and the hungweipings began in Shanghai and other cities. But all actions on the part of the people were ruthlessly suppressed. Mao Tse-tung also needed the hungweipings to create a semblance of mass support for his policy.



In January 1967, Mao Tse-tung, relying completely on the army, discarded his mask, ceased speculating with the "line of the masses" and began to form new bodies of power. The so-called "seizing of power" period had begun.

The Maoists set forth the task of creating "revolutionary committees"—provisional organs of power which were not provided for in the Chinese Constitution. The Maoists intended the "revolutionary committees" to be "the outcome of the so-called 'Triple Alliance'—of Party cadres, soldiers and representatives of the masses", with the military assigned the leading role. Mao's idea was to create a new political structure of society, in which the party, the army and the people would be knit together into a single whole by the chauvinistic idea of making China a special world power.

The setting up of "revolutionary committees" in the provinces was completed in the autumn of 1968. The leading role in these committees was played by the military.

In October 1968, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held its 12th enlarged plenary meeting. At this meeting Liu Shao-chi was "expelled from the Party forever" and was dismissed from all posts outside the party. The plenary meeting opened the stage of immediate preparation for a congress of the Communist Party of China, which was to legalize the results of the "cultural revolution".

Supreme power of administration in the country was delegated by the resolution of the 12th plenum to the so-called Proletarian Headquarters, which had fourteen members led by Mao Tse-tung—a group of people in whom Mao Tse-tung had special confidence. They included Lin Piao and his wife Yeh Chun, Mao's wife Chiang Ching, Mao's private secretary Chen Po-ta, Mao's son-in-law Yao Wen-yuan and other members of the Mao Tse-tung clan.

In assessing the results of the second stage of the "cultural revolution" it could be rightly said that a military-bureaucratic dictatorship of Mao Tse-tung was established in China. Its main characteristic was the army's participation in state administration and a full-blown regime of personal power.

The 9th Congress of the Communist Party of China justified and legalized the rout of the guiding bodies of the Party and

people's power in the course of the "cultural revolution", and the removal from the administration of party members who opposed Mao Tse-tung's line. The congress approved Maoism—a militarist political doctrine of Mao Tse-tung, hostile to Marxism-Leninism, as the party's ideological, theoretical and organizational basis.

The question arises of why a minority headed by Mao Tse-tung was able to install its dictatorship and prevail over the majority.

This occurred, above all, because the majority which opposed Mao was unorganized. The party leaders affected by the "cultural revolution" were unable to face up to Mao Tse-tung with a comprehensive and concrete programme of their own. In many respects they were even linked with Mao by having been deeply involved jointly with him in former policy, which paralyzed their determination. They opposed Mao on individual issues, while favouring great-power nationalism in the interpretation of the concrete content of socialism. The leading representatives of the Communist Party of China, who stood up against Mao in the course of the "cultural revolution", failed to fulfil their duty to the masses and were unable to mobilize them for struggle. On the other hand, the working masses, blinded by Maoist propaganda, let themselves be dragged by the Maoists into the struggle against the same forces in the Communist Party of China, against the bodies of the party and of people's government.

"The cultural revolution must be repeated every seven to eight years." This thesis of Mao Tse-tung's has been taken over by the new leaders of China. "Political revolutions of this nature will be carried out many times in the future," say the Rules of the Communist Party of China adopted by its 11th Congress. And although the congress officially proclaimed the "termination of the cultural revolution", threats against possible new opponents of Maoism were heard from its rostrum. "Hereafter, if within the country there are capitalist-roaders in power plotting to usurp the leadership of the Party and state, we will mobilize the whole nation to practise great democracy and topple them by launching a Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution under the leadership of the Central Committee headed by



Chairman Hua," Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee Yeh Chien-ying said in his speech.

This is the perspective which the Maoists have in store for the nation.

### Campaign of "Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius"

"If Lin Piao and his like came to power, it would be easy for them to implant capitalism."

Mao Tse-tung. "On the Dictatorship of the Proletariat"

When Mao Tse-tung's group consolidated its domination in the party and the state as a result of the "cultural revolution" it also put into motion a force which could become a real danger to the regime of Mao's personal power. A symbol of this potential danger was Marshal Lin Piao, appointed at the 9th Congress of the Communist Party of China the official "successor of Chairman Mao". He had influential forces standing behind him. Servicemen, who accounted for only oneseventh of the members of the Communist Party of China, held 43 per cent of the seats in the Maoist Central Committee and more than half the seats in the Political Bureau. The army had the same predominance in the provinces, where more than 80 per cent of the chairmen of the Revolutionary Committees of all levels were military men. This, however, did not worry Mao Tse-tung. For Mao the theoretician as well as for Mao the practical politician, the army and the gun had always been the decisive argument in seizing and keeping power. He was worried by something else. As a result of the "cultural revolution", military commanders belonging to the Lin Piao group had strengthened their positions. The members of this group accounted for 40 per cent of the military elite in China's supreme command; they constituted the same percentage in key civilian departments as well. This was what worried Mao Tse-tung, who wanted full personal control over the most important support of his regime.

Among the forces active on China's political scene in that period were a grouping of "Leftists", headed by Chiang Ching, who came to the fore during the "cultural revolution", and a

group of veteran party cadres many of whom were persecuted in the period of the "cultural revolution". The indisputable and permanent leader of this group was Chou En-lai.

Mao Tse-tung carefully watched the intricate rivalry between these two groupings and increasingly gave preference to the "Leftists", who became the mouthpiece of his ideas and the most active advocates of the Maoist policy.

Today, the new leadership of China, assessing the political situation of that period, asserts that Chiang Ching and her group "exploited for their own purposes every political movement launched on the initiative of Chairman Mao, tried in vain to sidetrack the movement" and thought to incite "disorganization of the Party, the army and the state". Nothing of the kind. In their actions the "Leftists" were guided by the instructions of Mao Tse-tung, who skilfully steered their efforts in the direction he needed.

At the beginning of September 1971, the struggle for power reached a climax and grew into a plot against Lin Piao.

The Maoist leadership had to discredit Lin Piao in the eyes of the people who had become used to regarding him as Mao's successor. A "plan of a counter-revolutionary coup" came to light—the "Theses of Plan 571" (in Chinese the numerals "571" have the same pronunciation as "an armed uprising"). This "document", studied in the country for many months, said that Lin Piao, with the support of his son Lin Li-kuo, deputy commander of the country's Air Force, and most of the top Air Force officers, worked out a plan to seize the mass media, assassinate Mao and change China's political orientation. Maoist propaganda, which gave so much publicity to the "Theses of Plan 571" on a large scale, lost sight of the fact that Chairman Mao himself appeared in them as a short-sighted politician who had extolled Lin Piao for decades, until he proved to be such a dangerous man for the state.

As a result of the removal of Lin Piao, in whose "exposure" Chou En-lai played an active part, the old cadres' group became stronger. In June 1977, the journal *Hungchi* described the situation in China in that period thus: "After the fall of Lin Piao's anti-Party grouping, there began, in 1972, rehabilita-



tion of a number of the old comrades and their re-assignment to posts."

However, the "Leftists", with the active support of Mao Tse-tung, succeeded at the 10th Congress of the Communist Party of China (August 1973) in occupying important posts in the Central Committee, in propaganda bodies, and in some provinces and cities. They then launched a mass propaganda campaign in the spirit of "orthodox Maoism". The press began to eulogize the ancient tyrant Chin Shih-huang, expressed admiration for the Legists (a medieval school of philosophy who advocated a rigid centralized government which used coercive methods to suppress opponents) and vilified the ancient sage Confucius.

On February 12, 1974, *Jenmin jihpao* carried an editorial entitled "To Carry Through the Struggle Against and the Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius". So Mao's recent "comrade-in-arms", Marshal Lin Piao, was chastised together with the ancient Chinese philosopher Confucius who lived more than 2,000 years ago.

What common crimes link these two people, who are so far apart in time? Before answering this question, it is necessary to turn to Confucianism, a teaching preached by the ancient sage, which had a tremendous influence on the history of China and the spiritual life of the Chinese people. Confucianism cannot be adjudged in simple terms. The main idea of this teaching is humility, subordination to one's superiors, whether the oldest member of the family or the head of the state; it leads to non-resistance to oppression and exploitation and to reverence for any power, which naturally merits Marxist-Leninist criticism. However, such Confucian concepts as respect for one's parents, esteem for elders, self-sacrifice for the sake of one's family, humanity, etc., are quite acceptable norms of behaviour for the modern man.

Mao Tse-tung and his group were not in the least interested in a serious analysis of such a complicated and varied phenomenon as Confucianism. Lin Piao, like Confucius, was accused by the Maoists of seeking to bring China back to the "reactionary period" preceding the "cultural revolution".

Mao Tse-tung resorted to his favourite method of political

struggle. He found historical justification for his policies, while the "horrid crimes" of Lin Piao in the Maoist interpretation added to the guilt of Confucius, and Confucian dogmas ascribed to Lin Piao sounded like proof of national betrayal. The tenor of this campaign may be judged by an excerpt from a keynote article in *Jenmin jihpao* of February 2, 1974. It says: "A bourgeois careerist, intriguer, a man of two faces and a traitor to his country, Lin Piao was a complete believer in Confucius. Like the reactionaries of all times, who hurl themselves into disaster, he worshipped Confucius...and used Confucius' teaching as a reactionary ideological weapon in his dirty attempts to usurp leadership in the Party, seize power and restore capitalism."

While the accusations against Lin Piao of "cunning attempts to kill the Chairman and restore capitalism" are of a demagogic-propagandistic character, other materials used in the "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" point more specifically to the real aims of this noisy campaign. It was directed, in particular, against such "economic crimes" of Lin Piao as a negative attitude to the Maoist adventures—the "great leap" and the "people's communes", denunciation of Mao Tse-tung's political intrigues and of his repression of many representatives of the party and the government, Lin's evaluation of the "cultural revolution" as a "cruel internecine struggle", his resentment of the Maoist idea of sending educated young people from towns to settle in rural areas, etc.

It is hardly credible that a man whom Mao Tse-tung used to implement the "cultural revolution" would stand up so openly against his former guide and collaborator. A great part of the accusations were invented by Lin Piao's critics. The Maoists let their potential opponents understand that Lin Piao's fate awaited all those who dared touch Maoist dogmas.

Another batch of accusations levelled at Lin Piao was connected with his policy in building the army, his alleged efforts to "implant separatism of the military". This reflects the fear of Mao Tse-tung and his group of the strengthening of local military commanders. Under the guise of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" the Maoists took the opportunity of getting rid of



undesirable commanders and to appoint in their stead followers of the "Leftist" group.

Under the pretext of criticism of Confucian canons, which Lin Piao was said to have shared, the Maoists were also fighting against humanity and legality in an effort to remove ideological and moral obstacles for violations of the law and arbitrary actions against the opponents of the regime, as during the "cultural revolution". The name of the despotic medieval emperor Chin Shih-huang began to figure largely in the Chinese press which put his "revolutionary" harshness and cruelty into contrast with "non-revolutionary" Confucian principles such as love for man. In the context of the Maoist regime, which mutilates man spiritually, seeks to subordinate him to the will of the "great helmsman" and transform man into cog-wheel in the monstrous mechanism of Maoism, there is naturally no place left for such "revisionist" feelings "preached by Lin Piao and Confucius" as respect for one's parents, love for one's family, etc.

Meanwhile the "Leftist" group, allegedly "disrupting the strategic plan of the Chairman", decided to strike at their political opponents—the veteran party cadres. At the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China Hua Kuo-feng said: "...the 'gang of four' did not criticize Lin Piao, only pretended to criticize Confucius and ran wild in criticizing 'the duke of Chou'...their spearhead was directed at Premier Chou En-lai, Vice-Chairman Yeh Chien-ying and many other leading comrades in the Party, the government and the army at central and local levels."

One might agree with such an assessment of the activity of the "Leftists", except that their acts did not "disrupt" the strategic plan of Mao Tse-tung, but were in full conformity with his plans to continue the "cultural revolution".

The results of the political campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" show that this campaign, despite its duration and fierceness, could not solve the tasks which Mao Tse-tung and his group had set. It was an instance of the unprincipled struggle within the Maoist leadership and resulted in a mere re-grouping of forces in this leadership, with the "Leftists" winning stronger positions. As for the main task—to deprive

the opposition of leadership, to prevent the very possibility of the people opposing Maoist dogmas—the results of the campaign were very poor. The campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" was followed by other political drives, such as the "study of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat" and the "criticism of the novel *Water Margin*", which pursued the same aim of eradicating the legitimate striving of the Chinese working people towards real socialism. A completely undesirable result of the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" for the Mao Tse-tung group was the mass discontent of working people, who were forced to engage in the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius in their working hours or in their free time after a hard day's work.

### Study of the "Theory of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat"

"The rise to power of revisionism means the rise to power of the bourgeoisie."

Mao Tse-tung. Documents of the  
10th Congress of the Communist Party  
of China

By the end of 1974, the campaign of "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" led to serious setbacks in the economy. Under these circumstances, the "moderate" wing in the Communist Party of China became more active. In January 1975, at the second plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee of the 10th convocation, the persecuted General Secretary of the Party Teng Hsiao-ping was elected Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. This plenary meeting was immediately followed by the first session of the 4th National People's Congress. The preparations for and the character of the session show that Mao Tse-tung had managed to deprive China's working class and the peasantry of the possibility of really influencing the activity of the supreme legislative body. The composition of the National People's Congress was not a result of democratic elections, but of "consultations and repeated discussions". The session was a closed one, being held in strict secrecy from the Chinese people.



The new Constitution of the Chinese People's Republic, adopted at this session, revised or abolished the main principles of the Constitution of 1954. The new Constitution made Mao's "thoughts" the state ideology of China. The Maoists proclaimed in the Constitution the inevitability of class struggle under socialism and thereby justified their terror and repression of progressive representatives of the working class and other strata of the population. They sanctified suppression of all who disagreed with anti-popular "thoughts" and Mao's policy, who demanded an improvement of the life of the Chinese people, a return to the road mapped out by the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China. The new Chinese Constitution deprived the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia of many rights and freedoms which they had won as a result of the victory of the Chinese revolution and which were enshrined in the 1954 Constitution.

Regardless of the fact that both the session and the Constitution adopted by it were permeated with the spirit of Mao's thoughts", Mao Tse-tung was evidently dissatisfied with its results. The very fact that the session approved a Constitution following the lawlessness of the "cultural revolution" and the socialist principles it proclaimed, even though formally, could arouse illusions of tendencies towards stabilization and order. Chou En-lai's appeal at the session for China to be made a strong modern state by the end of the century could also make people wonder how this could be achieved.

The masses of people, tired of endless political upheavals and hoping against hope, began to speak about the end of the "cultural revolution" and the improvement of the working and living conditions. These moods were very dangerous for Mao Tse-tung; they contradicted his theories of "upheavals", eternal "revolutionary poverty", etc. A new political campaign was needed by Mao Tse-tung to prevent such illusions and also to tame potential political opponents.

The initiators of the new campaign decided to direct their attack against so-called "bourgeois law" and "revisionism". They meant, among other things, the socialist principle of distribution according to work, the "eight-bracket wage system" in Chinese industrial enterprises and "remnants of private

ownership" (small subsidiary plots) in the countryside. At the same time, under the pretext of "continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat", the solution of all political, social and economic problems by methods of the "cultural revolution" and the "great leap" was again thrust to the fore.

On February 9, 1975, Mao's "latest instructions" on the dictatorship of the proletariat were published in China. This marked the beginning of a campaign of "study of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat".

Mao's "latest instructions" on the dictatorship of the proletariat have four main features: (1) The whole country must "be clear about the matter of the dictatorship over the bourgeoisie," otherwise, Mao claimed, "it is easy to slip into revisionism"; (2) "China is a socialist country, but differs from a capitalist country only by the form of ownership, which means that there still exists an eight-bracket wage system, remuneration according to work done, commodity barter, etc.;" (3) All these phenomena (later described as the "bourgeois law") cannot be liquidated under socialism, they can only be curtailed, and therefore, if people like Lin Biao come to power, it will be easy for them to restore capitalism; (4) "New bourgeois elements may appear", in the view of Mao Tse-tung, "in a part of the working class and a part of Party members".

These instructions determined the main directions of the unfolding campaign: first, study of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat (in the Maoist interpretation); second, curtailment of "bourgeois law", and third, exposure of "new bourgeois elements".

One of the acts in the first direction of the campaign was the publication of selections from 33 quotations in the central press on February 22, 1975; the Maoists carefully selected these quotations from the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin. They were studied for a long time throughout the country. The most important provisions of Marxist-Leninist theory on the dictatorship of the proletariat, namely, about the concept and time limits of the transitional period from capitalism to socialism, were grossly distorted. Maoism does not see the basic difference between the transitional period and socialist society. Also



distorted were the Marxist theses on the impossibility of the existence of antagonistic classes in socialist society, about the question of whom the dictatorship of the proletariat is exercised against (since representatives of workers, party members and office employees were also classified as "bourgeoisie", they became a target of the dictatorship) and about the functions of the proletarian dictatorship (everything was reduced to coercion and nothing was said about the constructive and organizational function of the dictatorship of the proletariat). The attempts of the Maoists to interpret socialism as a "transitional society" and artificially to transfer to socialism all the laws of this society are far from accidental. In this way it is possible "theoretically" to justify the entire set of Maoist dogmas, such as the existence of a sharp class struggle where it does not exist, the emergence of a new bourgeoisie in socialist society and the danger of bourgeois revival and, in particular, to justify mass reprisals against all the malcontents.

The second direction of the campaign, for the "curtailment of bourgeois law", entailed a broad-based propaganda campaign designed to convince the population of the harmfulness of such methods of economic management as remuneration according to work, bonuses and payment for overtime work, as well as monetary and commodity exchange, individual plots, auxiliary production in agriculture, etc. The Maoists identified all these phenomena with capitalism and demanded their "curtailment" and abolition. Not surprisingly, these theoretical manipulations of Mao Tse-tung were received very cautiously in the country. The Peking press was forced to admit that some people were unable to understand in the course of the campaign why it was necessary to admit the existence of "bourgeois law" in socialist society and why this law must be curtailed. Especially since this curtailment consisted in attempts to prove the necessity of abolishing bonuses and payment for overtime work where this practice still existed and because an attack was launched against the holding of individual plots and the right to engage in auxiliary production (this right was written down in the new Constitution). Slogans from the time of the "cultural revolution" began to appear, such as "To work more and to get less", "To work and not to think about a reward",

"To get to work half an hour earlier and to leave half an hour later", "To work eight hours and more, without special reward", etc.

In the third direction—exposure of "new bourgeois elements"—attempts were made to define their characteristics. The theoretical magazine *Hsuehhsy Pipan* (Study and Criticism) piled together all the vices and shortcomings in present-day Chinese society and worked out "ten criteria" for determining the class affiliation of a given person.

According to these "criteria", everyone in China guilty of such "vices" as an "attempt to leave work under the pretext of illness", "bias to intrigues", or "overeating", could be ranked in the "bourgeois class". By using this crude method of "determining class affiliation", the Maoists could label practically any representative of the workers, farmers or the intelligentsia as a "class enemy". And it is no wonder that in exposing the "new bourgeoisie" the Maoists also met with difficulties. They admitted in the press that "there are still workers who speak about the dictatorship of the proletariat and do not know where to look for the bourgeoisie in the socialist-society".

The struggle was mainly directed against executives concerned with the management of the national economy and against cadres in the provinces, and also against workers and farmers who were in favour of making use of economic levers for the development of the economy and for raising the standard of living. The Maoists were in fact preparing the ground for a new mass purge in all echelons of the party and state apparatus. Claims began to appear that in some places the leadership was lagging behind the masses, that it had not yet realized the importance of Mao's "revolutionary theory" and that it was necessary to "show vigilance with regard to the emerging class enemies". The paper *Kuangming jihpao* wrote on February 15, 1975: "There exists a handful of obdurate people who are attempting to organize a split and carry out a counter-revolution. The people must turn away from them and throw them on the scrap-heap of history".

However, transition to practical actions in "curtailing the bourgeois law" led to the resistance of workers and farmers



and to armed clashes in, among other places, Chekiang, Yunnan and Tungpeh. Eleven thousand soldiers were sent to Hangchow, according to official reports, to suppress unrest. Sabotage, strikes of workers and mass dissatisfaction of the working people with the new campaign could be observed everywhere.

These events greatly disturbed the Maoists. The tenor of the campaign became more cautious and the campaign began to die down.

However, Mao Tse-tung by no means intended to retreat or revise his position. He was preparing for another manoeuvre. As subsequent events revealed, a new political campaign soon spread throughout the country, also at Mao's direct instruction—a discussion of the ancient novel *Water Margin*.

### Criticism of the Novel "Water Margin"

"The WATER MARGIN is good because it describes capitulatory behaviour. The novel is negative study material, but makes it possible to see who the capitulants are."

Mao Tse-tung. "Instructions Regarding Analysis and Discussion of the novel WATER MARGIN"

Chinese literature has few works whose popularity can be compared with the classic 14th century novel *Water Margin*. For the Chinese its 108 heroes long ago became the embodiment of love and hatred, good and evil, cowardice and valour, faithfulness and betrayal.

The *Water Margin* tells the story of a peasant uprising at the time of the Sung dynasty (960-1279). The hero of the work, Sung Chiang, born into a family of well-to do peasants, does not succeed in winning favour at the court of the Emperor, joins the rebels and after the death of their leader Chao Kai heads the uprising. Sung Chiang's units were so strong that the imperial troops did not dare approach them. The main features of the hero's character (formerly, Chinese critics also made this point) are selflessness and fearlessness in the struggle against despotism and lies. Mao Tse-tung also used to share this view. At the Lushan plenary meeting of the Party Central

Committee (July 1959) he said: "Sung Chiang took from the rich to help the poor...He took only what belonged to the despots, and this is why his action was correct." However, in September 1975, Mao Tse-tung made this popular novel the target of his next political campaign.

Although the Maoists directed their criticism to the past in castigating the heroes of the *Water Margin*, they also pointed to their present-day counterparts. It was no coincidence that the criticism was once again directed against Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao and against "present-day Sung Chiangs", who had not yet been publicly named. It was not hard to guess that this concerned people, grouped around Premier Chou En-lai, who was in hospital at that time, and his deputy Teng Hsiao-ping.

This proved to be true. At the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China Hua Kuo-feng noted that the "gang of four" had indirectly attacked Premier Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-ping. It is not difficult to see that the "four's" action had been sanctioned by Mao Tse-tung. During that campaign Mao failed to "bring down" Teng Hsiao-ping with the hands of the "four", but he succeeded in doing so later when he urged the need to criticize Teng and then sanctioned his removal from all posts in the party and the state.

The problem of continuity of government and a desire to perpetuate the policy of Mao Tse-tung even after the death of the 'great helmsman' was the main aim of the campaign of criticism of the novel *Water Margin*.

One objective of the criticism was to strike at forces which might come out for an improvement of relations with the Soviet Union. Thus, the criticism of the novel assumed a clearly anti-Soviet character.

The discussion of the *Water Margin* did not last long—only two months. Mao himself capitulated in the struggle against the "capitulant" Sung Chiang. Towards the end of October the campaign was practically halted, having failed to achieve its aims. Its sad finale and the subsequent events which led to an open outburst of popular indignation against the policy of Mao's group on April 5, 1976 in the Tienanmen Square in Peking revealed that the contradictions between Mao's policy and the vital interests of the Chinese people remained irreconcilable.



## Campaign of Criticism of the "Black Wind of Right-wing Deviation"

"Politics is placed in the first place, production in the second; politics orders production . . ."

Mao Tse-tung. "Against Eclecticism",  
December 2, 1965

The task proclaimed at the fourth session of the 4th National People's Congress—"to make China in the course of the next twenty years, i.e., before the end of the present century, a powerful modern socialist power"—met with a ready response among ordinary Chinese working people, who regarded it as a chance to improve their living conditions.

As was later revealed by the press, the "moderates" in the Chinese leadership (mainly Teng Hsiao-ping, who before the session of the National People's Congress became Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau) advanced the thesis that "Mao's three directives" must serve as a "programme" for the country's development. These three directives were: "to study theory and to struggle against revisionism", "to work for stabilization and unity"; and "to achieve development of the national economy". These directives were proclaimed by Mao Tse-tung at different times and on different occasions. Teng Hsiao-ping and his followers brought them together and thus secured the possibility, in keeping with the first directive—orthodox in Maoist terms—of contributing in practice towards the development of the national economy.

The summer of 1975, when the thesis of the "three directives as a programme" was formulated, was later described by the Maoists as "months when the black wind of Right-wing deviation rose for the first time". However, at that time they were still unable to take steps to counter this "black wind", because the campaign of the "study of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat" had been ended due to the opposition from the group of moderates and the broad masses of working people and Teng still had the support of such a great authority as Chou En-lai.

Chou En-lai's last appearance in public was on September 7, when he received a Romanian delegation in the hospital. His illness had by then considerably advanced and it was clear that he would not live long. It was in this situation that the "Leftists" in the Maoist leadership organized the campaign of "discussion" of the ancient classic novel *Water Margin*. This campaign, just as the campaign of the "study of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat", was a prelude to the criticism of the so-called "black wind of Right-wing deviation". Teng Hsiao-ping was reminded of his earlier statements, such as "it is not important what colour the cat is, whether it is black or white; the main thing is that it should catch mice", a statement which was now seen as reflecting a "backsliding from class positions". And Teng Hsiao-ping's concept of "three directives as the decisive link", mentioned before, was judged to be utterly criminal.

The publication on December 31, 1975 of two poems by Mao, written back in 1965, i.e. on the eve of the "cultural revolution", poured oil on the fire of the new campaign. These two poems—*Ching Kangshan Again* and *Discourse of Two Birds*—was actually a call for a new round of the "cultural revolution", for the final defeat of the so-called "revisionist line". Mao's verses were a signal for a new outburst of mass hysteria in China. The Chinese press interpreted and commented on these literary exercises of Mao, which were difficult for ordinary people to understand, and stressed their "great political and practical importance". In its editorial of January 1, 1976 *Jenmin jihpao* wrote that Mao Tse-tung's verses taught how to approach the "cultural revolution" correctly and fight against the "black wares of peaceful coexistence". In various commentaries the Chinese press expounded with special zeal the militarist and anti-Soviet meaning of Mao's poems.

At the same time Mao's latest directive was promulgated: "Stability and unity do not mean a deviation from the class struggle. The class struggle is the decisive link and all the others in the chain depend on it." This dictum was in fact directed squarely against Teng Hsiao-ping's concept of "three directives as the decisive link", in which the class struggle, stability and unity, and economic development were placed alongside.



The appointment of Hua Kuo-feng as acting Premier after Chou En-lai's death was followed by open criticism of the concept of "three directives as the decisive link". On wall posters Teng Hsiao-ping was called by name, while in the press he was still "vaguely" referred to as the "unrepentant capitalist-roader within the Party". But Mao said quite explicitly of Teng: "This man is not waging the class struggle . . . It is all the same to him whether it is a black cat or a white cat, Marxism or imperialism."

In a few days, on February 29, *Jenmin jihpao* published another directive by Mao: "The main contradiction which the cultural revolution must solve is the contradiction between two classes—the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and between two roads—the socialist and the capitalist road. The focal point of this revolution is struggle against forces which are in power in the Party and are travelling the capitalist road."

Mao Tse-tung was well aware that the so-called "revision of correct conclusions", i.e., discontent of the masses with the "cultural revolution", was growing, and he saw that the only way out of this critical situation was a new suppression of the malcontents, which, as always, he gave the semblance of "class struggle".

This energetic activity of the "great helmsman" was not accidental. The Maoists were preparing to strike a serious blow. It was against this background that the events described as the "incident of April 5" took place. On that day, a spontaneous demonstration of 100,000 was held on the central Tienanmen Square in Peking, ostensibly to pay tribute to the memory of Chou En-lai. (On this day, deceased ancestors are remembered according to an old custom.) However, the slogans proclaimed by the demonstrators showed that the people were dissatisfied with the situation in the country.

The events on the Tienanmen Square marked the culmination and the end of the campaign against Teng Hsiao-ping. Troops inflicted reprisals on the demonstrators. Many participants in the demonstration were arrested and subsequently put on trial.

On April 7, Maoist propaganda published "two resolutions" of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

and its own version of the incident on Tienanmen Square. The "two resolutions" said that on the proposal of Mao Tse-tung, the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee had appointed Hua Kuo-feng First Deputy Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, and that it "discussed the counter-revolutionary incident on the Tienanmen Square and the recent activities of Teng Hsiao-ping", and removed him from all posts in and outside the party.

The events of April 5 showed that the people rejected the ideas and practice of the Maoists, which had led the country to an impasse. A way out of this impasse and a real prospect for China is the road indicated by the 8th Party Congress, from which Mao Tse-tung departed. The Maoists are artificially stepping up the "class struggle", organizing "upheavals" and periodic purges in society, thus trying to enclose their country within a "Chinese wall" in order to prevent it from returning to the path of Marxism-Leninism and of socialist construction in the new China. The same purpose is served by the slander of the Soviet Union and the methods of building socialism and communism in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The anti-Soviet slant of all the mass political campaigns of the Maoists is turning them into an obstacle to the solution of China's economic and social problems.

### By Way of a Conclusion

"We must speak about the class struggle every year, every month, every day, speak about it at meetings, at party congresses, at plenary meetings, at every sitting . . ."

Mao Tse-tung. Speech at the tenth plenum of the Party Central Committee of the 8th convocation, September 24, 1962

In the course of the continuing campaign of "exposure and criticism" of the group of Wang Hungwen, Chang Chung-chiao, Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan, Chinese propaganda



has quite frankly revealed the methods of its work. In a speech at the Second National Conference of Learning from Tachai in Agriculture on December 25, 1976, Hua Kuo-feng said: "For a long time, with the mass media under their control, the 'gang of four' spread a host of revisionist fallacies, trampled at will on the fundamental principles of Marxism and tampered with and distorted Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line and his various principles and policies."

In accusing the grouping of the use of propaganda to "usurp power in the Party and the state", the Chinese press had to speak about the methods high-ranking officials in Peking employ in their struggle for power. Only the "four", of course, are accused of using unseemly methods. In this way the present leaders are trying to dissociate themselves from the propaganda that was carried on in China for many years.

The powerful propaganda machine built in the country after the 1960s reminds one of an iceberg whose visible part is the press, radio, cinema and later television. The basic form of work among the population, the invisible part of the propaganda iceberg, was a ramified organization whose task was to "inform" the population and control the thoughts of millions of the Chinese. This was aided by a special, "secret" press, such as the newspapers *Tsankao Hsiaohsi* ("Reference News") and *Tsankao Tsuliao* ("Reference Materials"), which were printed in millions of copies and whose circulation was often bigger than that of the official *Jenmin jihpao*.

Speaking about the methods of "official propaganda", the authors of a number of articles published in *Jenmin jihpao* write that during the dominance of the "four" (i.e. for nearly two decades) these methods were reminiscent of the 'propaganda of Goebbels'. Caricatures of the former chief of Chinese propaganda, Yao Wen-yuan, intentionally showed him resembling Goebbels. "In his villainy Yao Wen-yuan is really like a political hooligan of the Goebbels type," the journal *Hungchi* wrote.<sup>1</sup> "Lies," adds *jenmin jihpao*, "were one of the main harmful features of the stereotypes of the 'gang of four'."<sup>2</sup>

Revealing the essence of these "stereotypes", *Jenmin jihpao*

1. *Hungchi*, No. 3, 1977.

2. *Jenmin jihpao*, February 26, 1977.

remarks: "The 'gang of four' trampled and deformed beyond recognition the style of work of the Party press. Long, noxious articles, senseless rhetoric...The 'gang of four' tried to shove as many Marxist terms as possible into their articles, not caring whether these terms were relevant or not in the context. The further the 'four' went in their dirty business, the more they resorted to a bombastic and didactic tone and frightening words to intimidate people. Their articles were full of official jargon, and were so long-drawn and dull that it was impossible to swallow them even with several attempts."<sup>1</sup>

Peking propaganda was compelled to admit publicly that all publications in the country were made according to one pattern, that the local newspapers and periodicals copied the central ones, as *Jenmin jihpao* put it, "the small papers copied the big ones". "When reading newspapers you only look at the titles"<sup>2</sup> — this is what readers said about the boring and monotonous articles of the official press.

Such admissions and exposures, typical of today's Chinese newspapers, are aimed at putting the blame for the situation in propaganda affairs on the "four" and at saving Mao Tse-tung from criticism.

Yet that propaganda was for many years the main weapon of Mao Tse-tung and his group in their struggle for power and in their efforts to implant "Mao's thoughts" in the country. For according to the theoretical postulates of Mao Tse-tung, the fundamental prerequisite for eliminating the exploiter classes is ideological and not economic struggle. Mao divorced ideology from the economic basis and made it the main field of battle with his opponents, alleging that the question of whether socialism will be built in China depends solely on ideology, or more precisely, on the triumph of his "line and ideas". Hence Mao's unflinching determination not to let the direction of the ideological struggle slip from his hands. Even at times of defeat, when he was compelled to "retreat to the second line", Mao granted his opponents the right to deal with the economy, but always kept a firm hold on politics and propaganda. It might be recalled that the organ of the Shanghai City Party Committee,

1. *Jenmin jihpao*, February 21, 1977.

2. *Ibid.*



the newspaper *Wenhueipao*, was used by Mao Tse-tung as a base for launching the "cultural revolution", and none other than Yao Wen-yuan mounted on the pages of the paper the first propaganda attacks on those who refused to share the views of his master.

In January 1966, a notice was distributed on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China which indicated that all students of higher educational establishments would have to undergo political and military training during their holidays, the main content of which was the study of Mao's works.

And on August 1, 1966, *Jenmin jihpao* carried an editorial entitled "The Whole Country Must Become a Great School of Ideas of Mao Tse-tung", which required that not only the schools and colleges, but also all offices, industrial enterprises, shops, etc., should be "large schools of the ideas of Mao Tse-tung".

A campaign for the study of Mao's works began all over the country; everywhere several hours were allotted daily for the study of Mao's "thoughts". "Groups for the study of Mao's works" and "courses for the study of Mao's ideas" became compulsory.

By January 1968, in Hopei province alone more than 100,000 various "courses for the study of Mao's thoughts" were set up involving five million people. In Peking these courses were attended by 2.5 million. In Hunan province there were 25,000 such courses, attended by more than three million people, and so forth.

The courses were of varying duration. Some lasted from seven days to a month, others from six months to one year. Some people abandoned work to study; the majority combined study with work—they worked half a day and studied for the other half. As a rule, all students were organized in a military manner—in sections, platoons, regiments and so on.

From 1969 on, congresses and rallies of "activists of Mao Tse-tung's thoughts" were conducted in all military districts and troop units. In 1970 "congresses of activists in the creative study and application of Mao's thoughts" were organized throughout the army, culminating in an all-army congress in

Peking. The delegates to these congresses were, as a rule, awarded the honour of being received by the leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and being photographed together with them.

All these "groups", "courses" and "schools" for the study of Mao's "thoughts" had an outlet to open propaganda through special "information groups" in the provinces and major cities and in government departments and offices.

This enormous propaganda network, which exists to this day, is designed for daily and hourly indoctrination of millions of people and also serves to control the thoughts and moods of the country's population. The work of instructing the Chinese nation in the doctrines of Maoism is conducted against a background of endless political campaigns, purges and repressions, in an atmosphere where a mere accusation of insufficient zeal in the study of Mao's "thoughts" is enough for a person to fall victim to physical violence.

When the "group of four" was deposed, the publications where the active adherents of this group had entrenched themselves were closed down, and changes in personnel were made in some government departments related to the information media. These were apparently the only "new tendencies" in Chinese propaganda.

The present Chinese leaders' declarations that "with the defeat of the gang of four" the people's minds have been completely freed and propaganda has been cleared of the "harmful influence of the four", are groundless. This, incidentally, has been noted by *Jenmin jihpao*: "Although the contents of the articles somewhat differs at present, their beginnings and endings look the same. Some comrades think that whatever they write, they must put certain phrases at the beginning and at the end if their writings are to be of any value. The masses call these routine official articles."<sup>1</sup> "Rectification of the style of the Party press is not progressing fast enough,"<sup>2</sup> the paper complains. But what rectification can there be when the arsenal

1. *Jenmin jihpao*, January 30, 1977.

2. *ibid.*, February 21, 1977.



of the Peking propaganda consists, as before, mainly of lies, the distortion of facts and the affixing of labels. The methods and instruments of the former leadership have been taken over by the new leaders.

Consider the political slogans advanced by the new leaders: "To bring about universal order in the country" and "To achieve four modernizations". The slogan of "bringing about universal order in the country" cannot produce the desired political effect because it is implemented with the old Maoist practices—purges, repressions, a build-up of the coercive apparatus, and public executions. The streets of Chinese towns today are full of lists of persons executed for "political crimes", as in the days of the "cultural revolution". Once again calls are made to "liquidate a handful of capitalist-roaders who are in power in the Party".

Emergency measures are really required because of the economic failures which the new leaders have publicly acknowledged. But the measures taken remain within the limits of Maoist slogans ("To wage a class struggle", "Politics is the guiding force", "To learn from Taching and Tachai", etc.). This is why the line of achieving "four modernizations" ("modernization of agriculture, industry, defence, science and technology") proclaimed by the new leadership is unrealistic, especially since the emphasis is made, in full conformity with the dogmas of Maoism, on the war industry and militarization of the country, amidst calls of "prepare for war".

Hua Kuo-feng began his propaganda activity with the publication of the fifth volume of Mao's works, to be printed in 200 million copies. As before, everything is being done to make the 800 million inhabitants of China blindly follow Maoist stereotypes. In the polemic with the "gang of four" Chinese propaganda was compared with Goebbels' propaganda. But even today such a comparison is not far from the truth. The propaganda makers in Hitler Germany used such methods and succeeded in poisoning the minds of the German people, one of the most enlightened nations in prewar Europe. The danger of petty-bourgeois, chauvinist propaganda influencing the Chinese people, who were under the yoke of feudalism for centuries, is infinitely greater.

The enemies of peace, socialism and *detente* are exploiting

the tragedy of the Chinese people to "ex-communicate" the Chinese People's Republic from socialism and further aggravate Soviet-Chinese relations. Such a short-sighted policy is doomed to failure. The forces fighting for China's socialist development and their friends abroad are confident that the Chinese people will overcome the domination of Maoism, this grim page in the history of China.

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